Extension or Communication
Translated by Louise Bigwood and Margaret Marshal
Preface

In this essay, Paulo Freire, the internationally renowned Brazilian educator who recently lived and worked in Chile, analyzes how technicians and peasants can communicate in the process of developing a new agrarian society.

Freire's thought is profound and at times difficult to follow but penetrating; its essence reveals a new world of truths, relations among these truths, and a logical ordering of concepts. We perceive that words, their meaning, their context, the actions of men, their struggle to dominate the natural world and to create their culture and their history form a totality in which each aspect has significance not only in itself but in function of the whole.

More than just an analysis of the educational task of the agronomist (mistitled an "extension agent") the present essay seems to me to be a profound synthesis of the role Paulo Freire attributes to education understood in its true perspective: that of humanizing man through his conscious action to transform the world.

Freire begins his work by analyzing the term "extension" from different points of view: the linguistic meaning of the word, a criticism based on the philosophical theory of knowledge, and a study of the relations between the concepts of extension and cultural invasion. Subsequently he discusses agrarian reform and change, demonstrating the profound opposition which exists between extension and communication. The agronomist-educator, like teachers in general, must choose communication if he genuinely wants to reach men--not by being abstract, but by being concrete, within a historical reality.

Reading this essay makes us realize the poverty and limitations of the concept of agricultural extension which has prevailed among us and many other Latin-American countries, in spite of the generosity and good will of those who have dedicated their lives to this work. We can see how
their failure to achieve more lasting results was due, in some cases, to their naive view of reality, but more com-
monly, to the marked attitude of superiority and domination with which the technician confronted the peasant within a traditional agrarian structure.
Freire shows us how the concept of extension leads to actions which transform the peasant into a "thing," an object of development projects which negate him as a being capable of transforming the world. In this concept the peasant is not educated but instead is treated as a depository for propaganda from an alien cultural world, containing the things which the technician (who is modern and therefore superior) thinks the peasant ought to know in order to become modern also.
Paulo Freire tells us, correctly, that:

Knowing, whatever its level, is not the act by which a subject transformed into an object docilely and passively accepts the contents others give or impose on him or her. Knowledge, on the contrary, necessitates the curious presence of subjects confronted with the world. It requires their transforming action on reality. It demands a constant searching. It implies invention and reinvention. In the learning process the only person who really learns is s/he who appropriates what is learned, who apprehends and thereby reinvents that learning; s/he who is able to apply the appropriate learning to concrete existential situations. On the other hand, the person who is filled by another with "contents" whose meaning s/he is not aware of which contradict his or her way of being in the world, cannot learn because s/he is not challenged.

In addition, Freire emphasizes that from a humanist and scientific perspective one cannot focus on technical capaci-
tation except within the context of a total cultural reality. Peasant attitudes toward phenomena like planting, harvest, erosion, and reforesting are related to their attitudes toward nature, their religious beliefs, their values, and so forth. As a structure, this cultural totality cannot be affected in any of its parts without an automatic reflex occurring in the other dimensions. Thus, the agronomist-educator cannot bring about a change of peasant attitudes in regard to a particular aspect of life unless he knows their world view and confronts it in its totality.
I would like to stress the importance of Freire's criticism of the concept of extension as cultural invasion, as an attitude contrary to the dialogue which forms the basis of an authentic education. He likewise deals with the concept of domination, so frequently found at the heart of traditional education, and shows how the latter, instead of freeing men, enslaves them, reduces them to things, and manipulates them by not allowing them to act as Subjects in history and through this action to become authentic persons.

Also fundamental is Freire's analysis of the relationship between techniques, modernization and humanism, as he shows how to avoid the traditionalism of the status quo without falling into technological messianism. As he quite correctly affirms, while "all development is modernization, not all modernization is development."

I think this brief mention of themes is sufficient to emphasize the richness and depth of this essay which Paulo Freire has modestly titled Extension or Communication. I hope it will be widely read, considered, and debated, because I am certain it will make us more conscious of the reality in which we act, and thereby contribute to making us increasingly responsible and authentic.

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Translated by
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Chapter I

a) A SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF THE TERM "EXTENSION"

A first concern in beginning this study is to make a critical analysis of the word extension. From a semantic stand-point words have a "basic meaning" and a "contextual meaning." It is the context in which a word is situated which determines its "potential" or "virtual" meanings, as Pierre Guiraud terms them. For this reason, in each of the following contexts, the word extension has a specific meaning:

- "This desk has an extension of three meters." "Color, in its essence, is the extension of the body." "The extension of the term extension was one of the subjects analyzed in the week of study." "The word 'structure,' which etymologically is basically connected with architecture, acquires a significant extension when it is used in economy, linguistics, psychology, anthropology, sociology etc." "Pedro is an agronomist working in rural extension." The meaning of extension in this last context constitutes the object of this investigation. The term extension, in the sense with which I am concerned here--that of the last context--implies the action of extending (more than in any of the cases cited) and of extending in its syntactical sense of a transitive relative verb with a double complement: to extend something to.

In this sense, the person who extends, extends something (direct object of the verbal action) to or towards someone (indirect object of the verbal action) who receives the content of the object of the verbal action. The expression "ex-

2. Rural extension: designates the educational and technical assistance effort of outside agencies acting through extension agents or extension workers to "extend" or transmit to peasants knowledge designed to improve farming practices, etc.
tension" in the context: "Pedro is an agronomist working in rural extension" means that Pedro is professionally engaged in an action which manifests itself in some kind of reality--an agricultural reality which would not exist as such if it were not for the existence of a human presence. His action, therefore, is that of the extension agent, who extends something towards someone. The rural extension agents would never think that their act of extending could have the meaning: "Charles extends his hands," although the same verb is used in the latter statement.

On the contrary, the role of extension agents is to extend, not their hands, but their knowledge and their technical capacities. For example, in an area designated for agricultural improvement as it suffers from erosion which limits its productivity, does the extension agent's action operate directly on the affected area or on the peasants conditioned by the situation of their region? If his action were to operate directly on the phenomenon or on the problem-situation, in this case, the erosion, without taking into account the human presence of the peasants, the concept of extension would not be applicable. However, the act of extension involves the relationship between human beings and the world in order for human beings to be better equipped to change the world. Thus, the concept of extension which is characterized by the transference of techniques and knowledge is in direct contradiction to a truly humanist outlook.

To return to the linguistic analysis. Modern semantic studies have emphasized the importance of "linguistic fields" in which words interact within a structural relationship of -dependence on each other. ("Words form a 'linguistic field' within a conceptual field, expressing a vision of the world which they reconstruct.") Studies have also analyzed the associative relationships which develop within the fields of meaning of various terms. Hence the concept of "associative fields." Analyses of "associative fields" of terms can reveal several different dimensions of the terms. I shall attempt an analysis of this kind, taking the term extension as

the subject. By doing this, in seeking to discover the dimensions of its associative field, the following can be derived:

extension .... transmission
extension .... active Subject (who transmits)
extension .... content (chosen by the transmitter)
extension .... recipient (of the content)
extension .... delivering (e.g., in extramural activities--something brought by a Subject who is "within the wall" to those who are "beyond the wall" or "outside the wall").
extension .... messianism (of the extension agent)
extension .... superiority (of the thing given away by the person giving away)
extension .... inferiority (of those who receive)
extension .... mechanical transfer (the action of the extension agent)
extension .... cultural invasion (through what is brought, which reflects the bringers' vision of the world, and is imposed on those who passively receive)

It appears that the act of extension, in whatever sector it takes place, means that those carrying it out need to go to "another part of the world" to "normalize it," according to their way of viewing reality: to make it resemble their world. Thus, in its "field of association" the term extension has a significant relation to transmission, handing over, giving, messianism, mechanical transfer, cultural invasion, manipulation, etc. All these terms imply actions which transform people into "things" and negate their existence as beings who transform the world. As we shall see, they further negate the formation and development of real knowledge. They negate the true action and reflection which are the objects of these actions.

It can be argued that this is not the meaning of extension. That extension is educative. It is for this reason that the first critical consideration of this investigation touches on the very concept of extension, on the "field of association" of its meaning. It can be seen clearly from this analysis that
the concept of extension does not correspond to an educational undertaking that is liberating. I do not, however, wish to deny the agronomist working in this field the right to be an educator-educatee, with the educatee-educator peasants. Precisely because I am convinced that it is their duty to educate and to be educated, I cannot accept that their work be labeled by a concept which negates it. It could equally well be said that this is a linguistic finesse which cannot change the essence of the extension agent's task. A person who makes such an affirmation both ignores what can be called the operating force of the concepts, and insists on ignoring the real connotation of the term extension. It is this operating force which explains why some extension agents, in defining extension as educative, do not see any contradiction in the statement: "One of the most difficult tasks is to persuade the rural masses to accept our propaganda and put these possibilities into practice [this means technical and economic possibilities]. This task is precisely that of the extension agent, whose duty it is to maintain a permanent contact with the rural masses." However worthy the educational intentions of the author just quoted may be—and reading his text inclines one to believe him—it is impossible to deny that for him a fundamental task of the extension agent is "to persuade the rural masses to accept our propaganda." It is impossible to affirm that persuasion to accept propaganda is an educational activity. I am unable to see how persuasion to accept propaganda can be squared with education: for true education incarnates the permanent search of people together with others for their becoming more fully human in the world in which they exist.

5. With regard to the overcoming of the educator-educatee contradiction this produces: there no longer exists the educator of the educatee nor the educatee of the educator but the educator-educatee and the educatee-educator. See Paulo Freire: Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Herder and Herder, New York, 1970. (Hereafter referred to as Pedagogy ... )

In the text quoted, "persuade" and "propaganda" are terms which seem to share a basic connotation which semantically meet in the term "extension." For this reason, "extension" cannot be squared with "education," if the latter is considered "the practice of freedom." The task is not to persuade the peasants to accept propaganda. Whatever its content--commercial, ideological, or technical, propaganda is always used for "domestication."  

To persuade implies, fundamentally, a Subject who persuades, in some form or other, and an object on which the act of persuading is exercised. In this case the Subject is the extension agent—the object the peasants. They are the objects of a persuasion which will render them all the more susceptible to propaganda. Neither peasants nor anyone else can be persuaded or forced to submit to the propaganda-myth, if they have the alternative option of liberation. Rather than a passive acceptance of propaganda, liberation implies the problematization of their situation in its concrete objective reality so that being critically aware of it, they can also act critically on it. This, then, is the real work of the agronomists in their role of educators. Agronomists are specialists who work with others on the situation influencing them. However, from a truly humanistic point of view, it is not for them to extend, entrust, or dictate their technical capacities, nor is it for them to persuade by using peasants as "blank pages" for their propaganda. In their role as educators, they must refuse to "domesticate" people. Their task is communication, not extension.

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7. domestication: to "domesticate" an animal is to tame it and thereby render it harmless as a household pet. Used metaphorically, "domestication" is the process whereby groups in power seek to channel or neutralize the potentially hostile forces unleashed by the consciousness oppressed peoples have of being exploited by those groups.
b) EXTENSION AND ITS GNOSIOLOGICAL MISINTERPRETATION

It seems clear (the point will be discussed further on) that the basic objective of the extension agent, working on extension, in establishing permanent relationships with peasants, is to try to change their "knowledge" (related to their action on reality) for other knowledge. This other knowledge is that of the extension agent. For a long time agronomists (as technical experts in the relations between human beings and the world) have been aware of the unquestionable importance of their being in close contact with the peasants with the aim of changing the peasants' manner of confronting nature. (Unfortunately agronomists have defined "world" exclusively as "nature"--that which results in production. 9 ) To the extent that peasants change their empirical forms of dealing with the land for other forms (those of applied science, that is to say, technical methods), this qualitative change in the process of confronting reality must also produce a change in the results, although not altogether automatically. Rural extension work is thus a specialized activity which is expected to produce these changes.

In the first part of this chapter, I made a semantic analysis of the term extension, and studied the "associative field" of its meaning, thus showing that this term and educational action of a liberating nature are incompatible. Thus the expression "educational extension" only makes sense if it is taken to mean education for the purpose of "domestication." Educating, and educating oneself for the purpose of

9. A. this study goes on, we shall see how disastrous It is not to be aware of the emergence, from the relationship between human beings and nature, of a strictly and exclusively human world, that of history and culture. This world is being permanently re-created, and in its turn conditions its own creator--who are people--in their manner of confronting the world and of confronting nature. It is not, therefore, possible to understand the relationship between people and nature without investigating the historical-cultural conditioning which governs their way of acting.
liberation, is the task of those who know that they know little (for this very reason they know that they know something and can thus succeed in knowing more) in dialogue with those who almost always think they know nothing. Their aim is that the latter can also know more by the transformation of their thinking that they know nothing into the knowledge that they know little. These initial considerations approach the central theme of the second part of this chapter, in which I will attempt to consider something of importance for the work of the agronomist-educator. I shall discuss the relationships between human beings and the world as basic factors of human knowledge, whatever the category and degree of the knowledge. In doing so I shall indicate the gnosiological misinterpretation to which the term extension leads. For clarification, some repetition is not out of place.

There is in the concept of extension an unquestionably mechanistic connotation, inasmuch as the term implies an action of taking, of transferring, of handing-over, and of depositing something in someone. This something that is being brought, transmitted, transferred (in order finally to be deposited in someone—the peasants), constitutes a group of technical processes, which imply knowledge, which are knowledge, and which imply the following questions. Is the act of knowing that by which a subject, transformed into an object, patiently receives content from another? Can this content, which is knowledge of, be treated as if it were something static? Is knowledge submitted to historical-sociological conditioning? If a simple conscious awareness of things belonging to the sphere of mere opinion (doxa)\(^{10}\) does not constitute "absolute" knowledge, how can this sphere be superseded by one in which these things are revealed and the "raison d'etre" of them touched?

The first gnosiological misinterpretation of extension lies in the following: If there exists a dynamic element in the

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10. dōxa and logos: in philosophical discourse, dōxa refers to mere opinion or to an unsubstantiated view, whereas logos designates knowledge based on evidence or rational considerations. Both terms are of Greek origin.
practice suggested by such a concept, it is reduced to the act of extending, in which that which is extended becomes static. Consequently, the extending Subjects are active in that they are "actors," in the presence of "spectators" in whom they deposit what they extend.

It could conceivably be said that the work of the agronomist-educator, going by the name of extension, like the work of the agronomist in any other field, is not subject to the type of considerations and analyses which are being made in this study. This affirmation would be explicable only from a narrow, ingenuous, and acritical point of view. The work of the agronomist-educator (which belongs to the domain of the human) contains a philosophical problem which cannot be ignored nor minimized. As in other cases, it is imperative to reflect philosophically. One cannot avoid this, seeing that the basic claim of extension is to substitute one form of knowledge for another. It is sufficient that forms of knowledge be under consideration for philosophical reflection to be required. What is fundamental is that this theoretical reflection should not degenerate into empty verbalism, nor, into a mere explanation of a reality thought to be permanently untouchable. In other words, not reflection in which explanation of the world signifies accepting it as it is, thus transforming knowledge of the world into an instrument for adapting men and women to the world.

When this reflection—although it is barely suggested in this essay—is truly critical, it allows us to understand dialectically the different forms in which human beings know in their relations with the world. Because of this, overcoming the ingenuous comprehension of human knowledge which we often retain is made indispensable. This ingenuousness is reflected in educational situations where knowledge of the world is considered as something to be transferred and deposited in the students. This is a static way of looking at knowledge, one which refuses to recognize confrontation with the world as the true source of knowledge with its different levels and phases.

Knowing, whatever its level, is not the act by which a
Subject transformed into an object docilely and passively accepts the contents others give or impose on him or her. Knowledge, on the contrary, necessitates the curious presence of Subjects confronted with the world. It requires their transforming action on reality. It demands a constant searching. It implies invention and re-invention. It claims from each person a critical reflection on the very act of knowing. It must be a reflection which recognizes the knowing process, and in this recognition becomes aware of the "raison d'être" behind the knowing and the conditioning to which that process is subject.

Knowing is the task of Subjects, not of objects. It is as a subject, and only as such, that a man or woman can really know. In the learning process the only person who really learns is s/he who appropriates what is learned, who apprehends and thereby re-invents that learning; s/he who is able to apply the appropriated learning to concrete existential situations. On the other hand, the person who is filled by another with "contents" whose meaning s/he is not aware of, which contradict his or her way of being in the world, cannot learn because s/he is not challenged. Thus, in a situation of knowing, teacher and student must take on the role of conscious Subjects, mediated by the knowable object that they seek to know. The concept of extension does not allow for this possibility.

This is why those who truly seek to know along with others the meaning of their involvement in this "dialogue" of subjects around a knowable object are not carrying out extension. On the other hand, if they do practice extension, they do not really share with others the conditions for knowing. If their action is merely that of extending elaborated "knowledge" to those who do not possess it, they kill in them the critical capacity for possessing it. The most that

11. Erich Fromm : The Heart 0/ Man ... "Knowledge means that the individual makes his own way. learning, feeling, experimenting with himself, observing others. and finally coming to • conviction without having an 'irresponsible opinion'.”
can be done in the extension process, gnosiologically speaking, is to show people, without revelation or unveiling, the existence of a new presence: that of "extended" contents. To capture the awareness of these contents as a simple presence does not make it possible for those who do so to possess real knowledge. Their only being aware of objects as things is merely realization of their existence and does not mean knowledge of them. On the other hand, human beings (who cannot be apprehended without their relations with the world, seeing that they are "beings-in-a-situation") are also beings who work and transform the world. They are beings of "praxis": of action and of reflection. Humans find themselves marked by the results of their own actions in their relations with the world, and through their action on it. By acting they transform; by transforming they create a reality which conditions their manner of acting. Thus it is impossible to dichotomize human beings and the world, since the one cannot exist without the other.

It is through these relations in which they transform and become aware of the presence of things (although this is not true knowing) that mere opinion or "doxa" is developed. Here fact, natural phenomena, things are presences of which people are aware, but which are not revealed in their own true interrelationships. Within the sphere of "doxa" in which human beings, we repeat, are ingenuously aware of the presence of things, and of objects, perception of this presence does not mean an "entering into" them, which would result in a critical perception of them. However, objects, facts, events are not isolated presences. One fact is always related to another fact, whether this is obvious or not. The perception of the presence of a fact also comprises the perception of its relations with others. They form one single perception. Thus, the form of perceiving

12. "Although 'doxa' may achieve a state of coherence, it does not imply an objective coherence in things. It does not even aim at being verified, that is, apprehended for rational, non-emotional motive."

Eduardo Nicol: Los principios de la Ciencia, Fondo de Cultura Economic, Mexico 1965, p. 44.
facts is not different from the manner of relating them to others. Both are conditioned by the concrete cultural reality in which human being find themselves.

This is what happens in the magic, or preponderantly magic cultures, which are of fundamental interest in that they still constitute the state in which the great majority of peasants of Latin America exist. The relationship between "things perceived" is in no way foreign to the magic way of thinking. Magic perception, which cancers the real and the concrete, is as objective as this relationship; magic thinking, however, is not. This is why, when a people perceive a concrete fact of reality without "entering into" it critically in order to be able to "look at" it from within, faced with the appearance of a mystery, and being unsure of themselves, they assume a magical posture. Finding themselves unable to apprehend the challenge in its authentic relationships with other facts, their tendency (understandably enough) is to go beyond the true relationships to seek an explanation for what is perceived. This happens not only with the natural world but with the historical-social world.

A priest who lives and works in a certain part of the Peruvian plateau told me that there, cold starry nights are a sign of a snowfall which will not be long in coming. When they perceive this sign, the peasants run to the highest point of the village and implore God with desperate cries not to punish them. If hail threatens, the same priest says, peasants make a great fire, and throw pieces of ash into the air, using special rhythms, accompanied by "words of power." Their magic belief, of a syncretic-religious type, is that the hailstones are "produced" by the spirits of those who die without baptism. Hence, the sanction this community imposes on those who do not baptize their children.

In the northeast of Brazil it is usual to combat a plague of lizards by fixing three stakes in the form of a triangle in the place most affected by them. At the end of one of the stakes there is a nail on which the peasant spikes a lizard. He is sure that the remainder will be afraid and withdraw "in procession" between the stakes. While the peasant is
waiting for them to go, however, he loses part or all of his crop.

An agronomist told me that in his round of work in a region in the north of Chile he came across a peasant community which was completely helpless in face of the destructiveness of some kind of rodent which was ruining its cultivation. When he asked them what they usually did in such cases, they replied that the first time such a "punishment" had taken place they had been saved by a priest. "How?" asked the agronomist. "He said a few prayers and the rodents fled terrified into the sea where they drowned," they answered.

What Can be done from the point of view of education in a peasant community which is at such a level? What can be done with communities which act in this way, whose thought and action—both magic, and conditioned by the structure in which they are situated—hinder their work? How can the practices of these people with regard to nature, based on the magic aspects of their culture, be replaced? The answer cannot lie with those extension agents who, in their relations with the peasants mechanically transfer technical information.

Magic thought is neither illogical nor pre-logical. It possesses its own internal logical structure and opposes as much as possible any new forms mechanically superimposed. Like any other manner of thinking, it is unquestionably bound not only to a way of acting but to a language and a structure. To superimpose on it another form of thought, implying another language, another structure, another manner of acting, stimulates a natural reaction: a defensive reaction in face of the "invader" who threatens its internal equilibrium.

Even when a community which thinks in a predominantly magic way is dominated by the cultural elements which in-

vade it, it reveals its resistance to the transformation which these elements bring. The typical form of natural defense takes concrete shape in syncretic expressions. When such communities perceive the foreign cultural elements, they modify them, giving them a kind of "purifying bath." These foreign elements thus retain something of their originality, particularly in their formal aspects, but acquire a new coloration, and a new meaning which the invaded cultural entity imposes on them. It seems important to me to observe the attitude people assume vis-à-vis their natural world, and consequently their cultural and historical world, this probably being an element in what constitutes the magic manner of thinking and acting.

Human beings are active beings, capable of reflection on themselves and on the activity in which they are engaged. They are able to detach themselves from the world in order to find their place in it and with it. Only people are capable of this act of "separation" in order to find their place in the world and enter in a critical way into their own reality. "To enter into" reality means to look at it objectively, and apprehend it as one's field of action and reflection. It means to penetrate it more and more lucidly in order to discover the true interrelations between the facts observed. However, the more we observe the behavior patterns and the thought-habits of peasants, the more we can conclude that in certain areas (to a greater or lesser degree) they come so close to the natural world that they feel more part of this world than transformers of the world. There exists between them and their natural world (and obviously their cultural world) a strong "umbilical cord" which binds them. This nearness which identifies them with the natural world makes the act of "entering into" it difficult for them, inasmuch as the nearness does not allow them to see in perspective that which they "enter into." A mistaken apprehension of what links one fact to another, induces a likewise

erroneous understanding of the facts. This, in its turn, is associated with magic action.

In situations in which "becoming aware of reality," of the elements which constitute it, takes an "entering into" form rather than a "belonging to" form, in situations in which the level of certitude and success is already assured by experience, magical formulae are despised.\textsuperscript{15} What cannot be denied is that whether we are dealing with pure "doxa," or whether we are dealing with magic thought, we find ourselves faced with ingenuous forms of apprehending objective reality. We are faced with simple forms of pre-scientific knowledge. The gnosiological misinterpretation of the term "extension" will not be helpful in collaborating with the peasants with the aim of substituting a predominantly critical form of acting for their magic ways. Extension as an act of transference can of itself do nothing or almost nothing in this sense.

Frequently the mere presence of new objects in a community, of a new method, of a different way of acting, produces mistrust and total or partial rejection. They can also be accepted. It cannot be denied that when the level of perception of the world (conditioned by the very social structure in which men and women exist) is maintained, these new objects, methods, or forms of acting, can also, as cultural manifestations which are foreign to the culture into which they have penetrated, be magically perceived.\textsuperscript{16} Hence, they may undergo a distortion in the new context to which they were "extended."

The question is thus not as simple as it might appear. Substituting "elaborated" techniques for magic ways of acting involves cultural aspects and levels of perception which make up the social structure. It involves problems of lan-

\textsuperscript{16} Even in the case in which the transformation take place suddenly, for example, through a process of accelerated industrialization, where there is no associated cultural action process in which there is a tendency to supersede magic forms of behavior, many of the latter are retained, limply taking a different form of expression according to the new element brought in, while others crystallize into traditions.
guage, which cannot be separated from thought, just as thought and language cannot be separated from structure. In whatever moment of history a social structure exists (whether it is undergoing a rapid transformation or not) the main task of the agronomist-educator (which is easier in the first case) is to attempt to overcome the magic perception of reality, simultaneously achieving technical training. At the same time it must overcome the "doxa" by the "logos" of reality. It is the attempt to extend knowledge which is largely sensuous to knowledge which, taking its departure from the sensuous, touches the raison d'être of reality.

The more one approaches the objective, challenging raison d'être of reality through action and reflection, the more one can reveal it by entering into it. Thus, to substitute our "elaborated" techniques for the empirical manner of acting of the peasants is at once an anthropological, epistemological, and structural problem. This means that it cannot be solved through the gnosiological misinterpretation to which the concept of "extension" leads.

Any attempt at mass education, whether associated with professional training or not, whether in the agricultural sphere or in the urban and industrial field, must (for the reasons just analyzed) possess a basic aim: to make it possible for human beings, through the problematizing of the unity being-world (or of human beings in their relations with the world and with other human beings) to penetrate more deeply the prise de conscience of the reality in which they exist. This deepening of the prise de conscience, which must develop in the action which transforms reality, produces with this action an overlaying of basically sensuous knowledge of reality with that which touches the raison d'être of this reality. People take over the position they have in their here and now. This results (and at the same time it produces this) in their discovering their own presence within a totality, within a structure, and not as "imprisoned" or "stuck to" the structure or its parts. When they do not perceive reality as the totality within which the different parts interact, they lose themselves in a "focalist"
vision of it. Merely to perceive reality partially deprives them of the possibility of a genuine action on reality.

It should be said in passing that this is one of the errors of various efforts made in the organization and development of communities, and also in so-called "leader-training." This is the error of not seeing reality as a totality. This error is repeated, for example, in attempts to train peasants by adopting an ingenuous attitude to the problem of techniques. That is, when it is not made obvious that techniques do not just happen. That polished or "elaborated" techniques, like the science of which they are a practical application, are socio-historically conditioned. Techniques cannot be neutral.

On the other hand, the knowledge of the peasants, which is by nature experiential (it cannot be otherwise) is equally conditioned. For example, their attitudes towards erosion, reforestation, seedtime or harvest (precisely because they are part of a structure and not isolated units) have a relation to peasant attitudes to religion, to the cult of the dead, to the illness of animals, etc. All these aspects are contained within a cultural totality. As a structure, this cultural totality reacts as a whole. If one of its parts is affected, an automatic reflex occurs in the others. A solidarity exists between the various dimensions which constitute a cultural structure. This solidarity, within which these various dimensions exist, produces different reactions to the presence of the new elements introduced into it. Any reaction has its own "frame of reference." If any dimensional unity is threatened, the fact is passed on to another, closely related to it. This relation may not always be visible, and may be obscure rather than clear. This can be seen when there is an attempt to modify techniques governed by beliefs. The same happens when beliefs are threatened, beliefs which for their part determine methods of action and forms of behavior.  

17. A North American sister told us that in some regions of the Peruvian high plateau, particularly subject to lightning, the peasants all go to chapel on Sunday morning "to hear Mass." She added that, on various occasion, she saw group of young peasants in front of wooden statue of horse
It is thus not possible for the agronomist-educator to attempt to change these attitudes (knowledge of these--and this cannot be ignored--occurs principally at the level of the senses) unless s/he is familiar with their view of the world, and unless s/he takes it as a whole. On the same level as the problematic discussion of erosion and reforestation, for example, the critical involvement of the peasants with their reality as a whole is imperative. To discuss erosion (in the problematizing dialogical conception of education) erosion must appear to the peasants in their "basic view" as a real problem, as a "distinct perception" firmly related to other problems. Erosion is not merely a natural problem, since the response to it, taking it as a challenge, is cultural. Indeed, the mere facing-up to the world by men and women is in a way already a cultural action. Because the answers peasants give to natural challenges are cultural, they cannot be replaced by superimposing the equally cultural responses (ours) that we "extend" to them.

Knowledge is not extended from those who consider that they know to those who consider that they do not know. Knowledge is built up in the relations between human beings and the world, relations of transformation, and perfects itself in the critical problematization of these relations. In order to discuss any kind of technical question with peasants, they must see this question as a "distinct perception." If it is not this, it must become this. Whether it is a "dis

With St. James proudly astride it, saying something she could not make out. "It seemed to me," the sister told us, "that they were speaking not only to St. James, but also to his horse."

One day, a priest who had just come to the village, and who declared that this behavior on the part of the peasants was a superstition prejudicial to the Catholic faith, removed from the chapel the object he considered to be profaning it. He placed St. James and his horse in the courtyard outside the chapel. When the peasants saw what had happened, they held a sort of council, and immediately invaded the chapel and destroyed nearly everything in it.

They recuperated St. James and his horse and re-installed them in their old place, and held a big procession in the main square of the village. For them, St. James was a sort of "lord of the lightnings .... "

If anyone offended him (worse still, if they removed him) and no one came to his defense, this could bring down the anger of the saint who would make the curse of the lightning fall on them . . . The priest nearly paid very dearly for his sectarianism and for bit ignorance of anthropology.
distinct perception" or not, the peasants still must in both cases apprehend the interplay of relations between the "distinct perception" and other dimensions of reality.

The effort required is not one of extension but of con-scientizacao. If it is successfully carried out, it allows individuals to assume critically the position they have in relation to the rest of the world. The critical taking up of this position brings them to assume the true role incumbent on them as people. This is the role of being Subjects in the transformation of the world, which humanizes them. The work of agronomists thus cannot be the schooling or even the training of peasants in techniques of ploughing, sowing, harvesting, reforesting, etc. If they limit themselves to a simple form of training, they can in certain circumstances obtain a better work-output. However, they will have contributed nothing (or nearly nothing) to the development of peasants as people. This means that the concept of extension, analyzed from a semantic viewpoint, and from that of its gnosiological misinterpretation, does not square with the indispensable technical and humanistic work which it is the agronomist's duty to carry out.
Chapter II

a) EXTENSION AND CULTURAL INVASION
NECESSARY CRITICISM

The analysis I propose to make in this chapter requires some prior considerations, considerations which revolve around a theme whose extension is easily recognized. These will be presented summarily, sufficient only to clarify the basic observations I shall make. The considerations concern a theory of action based on anti-dialectics, which is a theory of action diametrically opposed to one stemming from dialectics.¹

To begin with, only human beings, that is, beings who work, who possess a thought-language, who act and who are capable of reflection on themselves and on their own action (such actions becoming separate entities), only they are beings of praxis. They are praxis. Only they are beings of relations in a world of relations.² Their presence in this world, a presence which is a being with, comprises a permanent confrontation of the human being with the world. Detaching themselves from their surroundings, they transform their environment. They do not merely adapt to it. Humans are consequently beings of decision.³ Detachment from one's environment can only be achieved in relation with that environment. Human beings are human because they exist in and with the world. This existing implies a permanent relation to the world as well as an action on it. This world, be-

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¹. See Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Herder and Herder, New York, 1970, in which I discuss this question in full.
². On man as a being of relations and animals beings of contacts, and the connotations of these concepts, see Education as the Practice of Freedom, in this volume.
³. The term "decision" comes from "to decide" from the Latin decidere: to cut. In the text, following its etymology, the term "decision" means the "cutting" people perform to separate themselves from the natural world while continuing in the world. The operation of "entering into" the world is implicit in decision.
cause it is a world of history and culture, is a world of men and women—not simply a world of "nature."

Human actions in the world are conditioned by their own results, by their own outcome. Thus there are different degrees of relations to the world, different degrees of action and perception. Nevertheless, whatever the degree of action on the world, it implies a theory. Even those actions called magic are governed by theory.4

We must have a clear and lucid grasp of our action (which implies a theory) whether we wish to or not. Instead of the mere "doxa" of the action we perform, we must go right to its "logos." That is the specific task of philosophical reflection.5 The role of this reflection is to react to the action and to reveal its objectives, its means, and its efficacy. When this is done, what perhaps previously did not appear as the theory of action, is now revealed as such. If there is no dichotomy between theory and practice, reflection on our actions reveals the theory—without which the action (or practice) is not a true one. The practice in turn acquires a new significance when it is illustrated by a theory.

I shall try to show in this chapter that the theory implicit in the action of extending, in extension, is anti-dialogical. As such, it is incompatible with true education.6 The anti-dialogue nature of the term "extension" emerges clearly from the analyses made in the first two parts of this essay where it was studied semantically and its gnosiological misinterpretation discussed. Anti-dialogue and dialogue are embodied

4. "The magic art is directed toward the attainment of practical end; like any other art or craft it is also governed by theory, and by a system of principles which dictate the manner in which the act has to be performed in order to be effective. Thus, magic and science show a number of similarities and with Sir James Frazer, we can appropriately call magic a pseudo science." Malinowski, Bronislaw, op. cit., p. 140.

5. The philosophy of science, or of techniques, is not the pastime of those who do nothing. Nor is it a waste of time, as technocrats—if not technicians—may imagine.

See also footnote 10, Chapter I of this study.

6. This does not mean that all agronomists (or so-called extension agents) are necessarily anti-dialogical. It simply means that if and when they engage in dialogue they cannot practice rural extension. If they participate in rural extension they cannot engage in dialogue.
in contradictory forms of action; the latter in turn imply equally irreconcilable theories. Some of these forms of action interact in an anti-dialogical sense, others in a dialogical sense. Thus, the factor which distinguishes an action of anti-dialogue cannot be a constitutive element of an action of dialogue and vice versa.

Among the various characteristics of the anti-dialogical theory of action, I have chosen to consider one: cultural invasion. Any invasion implies, of course, an invading Subject. His cultural-historical situation which gives him his vision of the world is the environment from which he starts out. He seeks to penetrate another cultural-historical situation and impose his system of values on its members. The invader reduces the people in the situation he invades to mere objects of his action.

The relationships between invader and invaded are situated at opposite poles. They are relationships of authority. The invader acts, the invaded are under the illusion that they are acting through the action of the other; the invader has his say; the invaded, who are forbidden this, listen to what the invader says. The invader thinks, at most, about the invaded, never with them; the latter have their thinking done for them by the former. The invader dictates; the invaded patiently accept what is dictated. For the cultural invasion to be effective, and for the cultural invader to attain his objectives, the action must be supported by other complementary actions, ones which constitute different dimensions of the anti-dialogue theory. Thus, any cultural invasion presupposes conquest, manipulation, and messianism on the part of the invader. It presupposes propaganda which domesticates rather than liberates. Since cultural invasion is

7. Authoritarianism need not necessarily be associated with physical repression. It can also be seen in actions based on the "argument of authority," "This is the right way-it's technically correct-don't raise questions, just do it."

8. For having one's say, and the meaning of this act, see Paulo Freire: *La Alfabetizacion de Adultos: la Critica de su vision ingenua y la comprension de su vision critica*. Ermani, Maria Fiori: *Aprender a decir su palabra-el Metoda de Alfabetizacion del Profesor Paulo Freire*, Santiago, 1968.
an act of conquest *per se*, it needs further conquest to sustain itself.

Propaganda, slogans, myths are the instruments employed by the invader to achieve his objectives: to persuade those invaded that they must be the objects of his action, that they must be the docile prisoners of his conquest. Thus it is incumbent on the invader to destroy the character of the culture which has been invaded, nullify its form, and replace it with the byproducts of the invading culture.

The manipulation
-never the organization---of the individuals belonging to the invaded culture is another integral feature of the anti-dialogical theory of action. As a form of leadership which exploits the emotions of the people, manipulation inculcates into the invaded the illusion of acting or their acting within the action of the manipulators. In that manipulation encourages "massification" it categorically contradicts the affirmation by human beings as Subjects. Such affirmation can only occur when those who are engaged in a transforming action upon reality also make their own choices and decisions. In fact manipulation and conquest, as expressions of cultural invasion, are never means for liberation. They are always means for "domestication." True humanism, which serves human beings, cannot ac-

9. Manipulation is a typical feature of those societies which undergo the process of historical transition, from the "closed" type of society to an "open" one in which the presence of the emerging masses makes itself felt. In the preceding stage of the process, the masses are "submerged" in society. But when they emerge from the transition they undergo a change of attitude: from being mere spectators they insist on participation and a share in running affairs. These circumstances produce the phenomenon of populism which is the answer to the emergence of the masses. Populist leadership, as part of the action of manipulation, becomes the mediator between the emerging masses and the oligarchic elites.

10. By "massification" I do not mean the process of the emergence of the masses (referred to in the previous note), which results in their search to affirm themselves and participate historically (society of masses), but state in which people do not make their own decisions although they may think that they do.

"Massification" is dehumanization and alienation. The "irrational" and the "myth" are always associated with "massification," The same meaning is implied in phrases such as "mass society," "mass man," "the faceless crowd," etc.
cept manipulation under any name whatsoever. For humanism there is no path other than dialogue. To engage in dialogue is to be genuine. For true humanism, to engage in dialogue is not to engage without commitment. Humanism is to make dialogue live. Dialogue is not to invade, not to manipulate, not to "make slogans." It is to devote oneself to the constant transformation of reality. In that dialogue is the content of the form of being which is peculiarly human, it is excluded from all relationships in which people are transformed into "beings for another" by people who are false "beings for themselves." Dialogue cannot imprison itself in any antagonistic relationship. Dialogue is the loving encounter of people, who, mediated by the world, "proclaim" that world. They transform the world and in transforming it, humanize it for all people. This encounter in love cannot be an encounter of irreconcilables.

Cultural invasion through dialogue cannot exist. There is no such thing as dialectical manipulation or conquest.\textsuperscript{11} These terms are mutually exclusive. Although I have said that not all agronomists who are called extension agents practice cultural invasion, it is not possible to ignore the ostensible suggestion of cultural invasion in the term "extension."

This is not a pointless argument. The moment social workers define their work as assistencialism\textsuperscript{12} and yet say that it is educational, they commit a mistake which has fatal consequences. In the same way, when linguists say they are "functionalists," they cannot, as "functionalists," state that language is a system of relationships. Similarly, those who

\textsuperscript{11} Conquista (conquest): feminine participle of the old form conquérir: to conquer. Latin: conquérir: to seek everywhere. It is not necessary to leek people everywhere. On the contrary one should be with them.

The conquest implicit in dialogue is the conquest of the world for the becoming more fully human of all human beings.

\textsuperscript{12} assistencialism: a term used in Latin America to describe policies of financial or social "assistance" which attack symptoms, but not causes, of social ills. It has overtones of paternalism, dependency, and a "hand-out" approach. It contrasts with "promocionalismo" which, on the contrary, "promotes" people to a state of vigorous self-capacity to solve their own problems.
reduce all objectivity to human beings and their consciousness\textsuperscript{13} (including the existence of other human beings) cannot discuss the dialectic of Subjectivity-objectivity. They cannot accept the existence of a concrete, objective world with which human beings are involved in a permanent relationship. If a social worker (in the broadest sense) supposes that s/he is "the agent of change," it is with difficulty -that s/he will see the obvious fact that, if the task is to be really educational and liberating, those with whom s/he works cannot be the objects of her actions. Rather, they too will be agents of change.\textsuperscript{14} If social workers cannot perceive this, they will succeed only in manipulating, steering and "domesticating." If on the other hand they recognize others, as well as themselves, as agents of change, they will cease to have the exclusive title of "the agent of change."

This then is the dilemma of agronomists and extension agents, in the face of which they must be critically aware. If, in accordance with the concept of extension, they transform their specialized knowledge and methods into something static and materialized and extend them mechanically to the peasants-invading the peasant culture and view of the world-they deny that men and women are beings who make decisions. If, however, agronomists affirm their knowledge through dialogical work, they neither invade, manipulate, nor conquer. They thus deny the connotation of the term "extension."

There is one argument, with which I wish to deal, that has frequently emerged in the study-encounters that I have had with agronomist-extension agents. This argument is presented as if it were indestructibly, basic to explain the need for an anti-dialogical action on the part of agronomists vis-à-vis peasant communities. It refers to the question of time, or to use the usual technical expression, "time-wasting."

For many, if not the majority of agronomists with

\textsuperscript{13} The idealist theory of subjectivity known as solipsism; Latin: \textit{solo}: only. \textit{ipse}: same.

\textsuperscript{14} For this, see Paulo Freire: "The Role of the Social Worker in the Process of Change," in \textit{Sobre la Acción Cultural}, ICIRA, Chile, 1970.
whom I have participated in seminars dealing with the aspects I have raised in this study, "dialogue is not viable. This is because its results are slow, uncertain and long-drawn-out." "Its slowness," say others, "in spite of the results it may produce, is at odds with the urgent need of the country to stimulate production." "Thus," they affirm emphatically, "this time-wasting cannot be justified. In choosing between dialogue and anti-dialogue, we accept the latter as it is more rapid." There are even those who are so influenced by the urgency of time as to clearly state that "it is important to make 'deposits' of technical knowledge in the peasants, so that they will rapidly be able to replace empirical habits with appropriate modern techniques." "We are faced," say others, "with a very worrying problem—that of production-increase. How can we possibly waste so much time attempting to fit our actions into the framework of the cultural conditions of the peasants? How can we waste so much time on dialogue with them?" "There is an even more serious point," others announce. "How can we dialogue about technical affairs? How can we dialogue with peasants about a technical method they are not familiar with?" "Dialogue would be possible if its theme concerned their daily life and did not deal with technical methods."

In the face of the concerns and the questions (which are in fact categorical affirmations) thus expressed, I think that there can be no doubt that we are confronted with the defense of cultural invasion as the sole solution of the agronomist. It is important that I take the time to analyze these affirmations, which are almost always presented or expressed in the form of questions.

Firstly, it is not difficult to see that these questions reflect the gnosiological misinterpretation implicit in the term, extension and discussed in the first chapter. They unquestionably reveal a false conception of the way knowledge is acquired. For the extension agent knowledge is the result of the act of depositing contents into "empty consciousness." 15

15. See Pedagogy of the Oppressed, op. cit.
The more active the person who deposits, the more passive and docile those who receive, the more comprehension there will be. Within this misconception, these affirmations suggest ignorance of the historical-sociological conditions for knowledge to which I have referred several times. Their authors forget that although the rural areas receive urban influences through radio, and although communication is made easier by the construction of roads that diminish distances, nevertheless they still retain their basic forms of being. These rural forms differ from urban ones even with regard to the manner of walking, of dressing, of speaking, and of eating. This does not mean that people cannot change. It simply means that such changes are not mechanical ones.

In my opinion such affirmations express an unjustified lack of faith in people, an underestimation of their power of reflection, of their ability to take on the true role of seekers of knowledge: that of the Subjects of this search. Hence the tendency to transform them into objects of the "knowledge" imposed on them. Hence the haste to make them the docile and patient recipients of "communiqués" which are injected into them, while on the contrary the act of knowing and of learning requires of people an impatient, unquiet, indocile attitude. It requires a seeking, which, inasmuch as it is a seeking, cannot be reconciled with the static attitude of one who merely acts as the depository of the contents delivered by another.

This lack of faith in people in turn reveals another error: the assertion that their ignorance is absolute. Such an assertion is always associated with an ingenuous conception of knowledge as a deposit. If people are assumed to be absolutely ignorant, there must be people who think of them in this way. The latter, the subjects of this definition, naturally classify themselves as those who know. By affirming the absolute ignorance of others, they reveal their own ignorance. This means that they practice what I call the "alienation of ignorance." This supposes that ignorance is always present in others, never in the person who "alienates."
In fact, it is enough that we recognize that men and women are beings who are in permanent relation with the world which they transform through their work to be aware of them as beings who know, although this knowledge is manifested at different levels: of "doxa," of magic, and of "logos," which is true knowledge. In spite of all this, or perhaps because of it, neither ignorance nor knowledge can be absolute. No one can know everything, just as no one can be ignorant of everything. Knowledge begins with the awareness of knowing little (in the function of which one acts). And knowing that they know little, people are prepared to know more. If we possessed absolute knowledge, this knowledge could not exist because it would not be in a state of being. A person who knew everything would not be able to continue knowing because s/he would never ask anything. Human beings constantly create and re-create their knowledge, in that they are inconclusive, historical beings engaged in a permanent act of discovery. All new knowledge is generated from knowledge which has become old, which in its turn had been generated from previous knowledge. Thus, knowledge is in constant succession, such that all new knowledge, when it is established as such, becomes the basis for the knowledge which will replace it.

What can be said about the affirmation that dialogue is not viable principally because it implies a waste of time? What are the empirical facts behind this very categorical affirmation, which results in those who make it choosing to donate or to impose their techniques?

Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that all those who make such an affirmation have already tried dialogical experiments with the peasants. Let us also suppose that these experiments were carried out according to the principles which lie behind true dialogue. That the group dynamic sought was not attempted by manipulative techniques and that despite everything dialogue was difficult, and participation nearly or entirely non-existent. Even in that event, should one conclude that dialogue is not viable and accept that such a strategy is a waste of time? Have we asked,
investigated, and sought to know the reasons why peasants remain silent and apathetic in the face of our attempts at dialogue with them? Where else can one seek these reasons but in the historical, sociological, and cultural conditions which condition them?

Continuing, for the sake of argument, to suppose the above hypotheses to be true, I must assert that peasants do not refuse to dialogue because they are by nature opposed to dialogue. There are historical-sociological, cultural, and structural reasons for their refusal. Their existential experience is constituted within the limits of anti-dialogue. The latifundist16 structure, which is colonial by nature, enables the landlord (because of strength and prestige) to extend his "possession" over the people as well as over the land. This "possession" of the people, who are more or less "reified," is expressed through an interminable series of limitations which diminish their field of free acting. Even when the personality of a more humane land-owner lends itself to the establishing of relations of affection between the land-owner and his "tenants," the "social distance" between them is still not eliminated. Closeness of an affective type between persons of different "social status" does not diminish the distance imposed by and implicit in the "status."

In this affective closeness one should observe not only the "humanitarianism" of an individual but also the structure in which s/he is placed and by which s/he is conditioned. This is why the latifundial structure cannot transform the humanitarianism of a few into the true humanism of all.

In this rigid, vertical structure of relationships there is no real room for dialogue. It is within these same rigid vertical relations that the peasant consciousness is historically developed. This is the consciousness of the oppressed. With no experience of dialogue, with no experience of participation, the oppressed are often unsure of themselves. They have consistently been denied their right to have their say, having historically had the duty to only listen and obey.

16. See definition for *latifundium* p. 15.
It is thus normal that they almost always maintain an attitude of mistrust towards those who attempt to dialogue with them. Actually, this distrustful attitude is directed also toward themselves. They are not sure of their own ability. They are influenced by the myth of their own ignorance. It is understandable that they prefer not to engage in dialogue, that after fifteen or twenty minutes of active participation, they say to the educator: "Excuse us, sir, we who don't know should keep quiet and listen to you who know." Those who declare dialogue to be impossible will probably say that these observations only serve to reinforce their hypotheses. This is not true. What these considerations clearly reveal is that the difficulty of dialogue with peasants does not arise because they are peasants, but comes from the social structure, in that it is "permanent" and oppressive.

A more serious question would be the investigation of the possibility of dialogue as long as there is no change in the latifundia structure since it is in this structure that the explanation of the silence of the peasants lies. This silence begins in one way or another to disappear in areas undergoing agrarian reform or subject to the indirect influence of such areas, as I observed in Chile. Be this as it may, whether agronomists experience many or few difficulties, it will not be with anti-dialogue that the silence of the peasants will be broken, but with a dialogue in which this very silence and its causes are presented as a problem. The work of the agronomist as educator is not confined, and should not be confined to the domain of techniques. For techniques do not exist without men and women, and men and women do not exist apart from history, apart from the reality they have to transform.

The difficulties which hierarchical structures, to a greater or lesser degree, impose in the task of dialogue, do not justify anti-dialogue-of which cultural invasion is a direct consequence. However serious the difficulties, those who are

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17. Referred to by Alvaro Manriquez, of the Institut, for Agricultural and Livestock Development (INDAP) in one of his presentations on the psycho-social method among Chilean peasants.
committed to human beings, to their cause and to their liberation cannot indulge in anti-dialogue.\textsuperscript{18} These are the difficulties which cause agronomists--and not only agronomists--to talk of lost time or of the time wasted in dialogue. This is the loss of time that would be harmful to the success of the objectives of a program to increase production. Such an increase in production, it is argued, is vital for the nation. It would of course be ingenuous not to emphasize the importance of production. But what can be said--and the reader will allow me to state the obvious--is that agricultural production does not exist in a vacuum. It is a result of the relations between human beings and nature (prolonged into the relations between human beings and their historical-cultural dimension), the conditions of which we have already discussed several times in this essay. If agricultural production were concerned merely with things, and had nothing to do with the confrontation of human beings and their world, there would be no need for dialogue. (And this would be so just because it is only through human beings that things have their place in time; from human beings they acquire an accepted and a meaningful significance. Things neither communicate nor recount.) But this cannot be the case for people, who are historical beings, able to give an autobiography of themselves. From a human point of view, lost time is that in which people are "reified."\textsuperscript{19} Lost time, even time which gives the illusion of having been saved, is time spent in bla-bla-bla, in verbalism, just as pure activism is also time lost; neither constitutes the time of true praxis.

Time spent on dialogue should not be considered wasted

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\textsuperscript{18} Regarding dialogical work on structures which have not been transformed, see Paulo Freire: a) "The Role of the Social Worker in the Process of Change," in \textit{Sobre la Accion Cultural, op. cit.} b) "The Duty of the Professional Towards Society." See further, Ernani, Maria Fiori: "Aprender a decir su palabra--el Metodo de Alfabetizacion del Profesor Paulo Freire." \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{19} However, from a concrete, realist viewpoint, which is not strictly ethical, it is not lost time, since it is precisely from this that the new "time," with its new dimensions, in which people will triumph over their human condition, is generated.
time. It presents problems and criticizes, and in criticizing, gives human beings their place within their own reality as the true transforming Subjects of reality. Even when we regard the work of the agronomist-educator as limited to no more than the teaching of new techniques, there is no comparison between dialogue and anti-dialogue. Any delay caused by dialogue-in reality a fictitious delay-means time saved in firmness, in self-confidence, and confidence in others, which anti-dialogue cannot offer.

Let me consider finally the statement which asserts that dialogue is not possible if the information to be transmitted is of a scientific or technical kind. This includes all "knowledge" that is beyond the historical experience of the recipients. It is always said that it is impossible to dialogue with peasants about agricultural techniques, just as it is impossible in the primary school to dialogue, for example, about the fact that \( 4 \times 4 \) cannot be 15. Similarly it is said to be impossible to create a dialogue with pupils about a historical fact, which took place at a certain time and in a certain way. The only thing for the educator to do is to recount the facts, which must then be memorized. There is certainly an error in these doubts which, as I have said, are almost always in fact affirmations. In many cases, this error is possibly the result of a failure to understand what dialogue is, what knowledge is, and how both are constituted. The use of dialogue does not require that the pupil retrace each of the

20. However, agricultural techniques are not foreign to the peasants. Their daily work is a confrontation with the land, preparing it and cultivating it. This takes place within the limit of their experience, that is, within the limits of their culture.

It is not only a matter of teaching them, but also of learning from them. It would be difficult for an experienced and receptive agronomist not to gain some benefit from living with the peasants. If dialogue reveals the structural difficulties I have already analyzed, anti-dialogue will encounter greater difficulties still. The former is able to overcome inherent difficulties by posing them as problem to be confronted by both the peasants and the agent. The latter by its very nature cannot represent the difficulties in this way. It has to substitute the methods of the agent for the empirical methods of the peasants. Since successful substitution require critical acts of decision (which anti-dialogue does not engender) it results in the mere superposition of planned methods on the empirical methods of the peasants.
steps taken historically in the growth of scientific and technical knowledge. Nor does it require that students guess or indulge in a purely intellectual game of empty words. Dialogue In any situation (whether it involves scientific and technical knowledge, or experiential knowledge) demands the problematic confrontation of that very knowledge in its unquestionable relationship with the concrete reality in which it is engendered, and on which it acts, in order to better understand, explain, and transform that reality. The fact that 4 X 4 is 16 and that this is only true in a given system does not mean that the pupil ought simply to memorize that 4 X 4 is 16. The objectivity of this truth in one system has to be shown problematically. Actually, 4 X 4 would be a false abstraction if it were not related to reality, especially as learned by a child. In a table to be learned by heart 4 X 4 is one thing; 4 X 4 translated into concrete experience is another: e.g., making four bricks four times. Instead of mechanically memorizing 4 X 4, the pupil ought to discover its relation to something in human life.

This scientific task requires discussion—the historical dimension of knowledge, its placing in time, its instrumentality. All this is a subject of investigation and dialogue. Thus an historical fact cannot just be recounted with an exaggerated delight in the details of dates, and reduced to something static to be put on a calendar and fixed. If it is not possible to abstain from talking about what happened and how it happened, the fact itself must be stated problematically for the pupils. They must reflect on the "wherefore" of the fact and on its connection with other facts in an overall context. It could be said that the task of the history teacher is to situate isolated historical facts in their totality, to "explain" history. For me the task is something different: it is to present the material in such a way as to encourage students to think critically so that they might give their own interpretations to the data.

If education is dialogical, it is clear that the role of the teacher is important, whatever the situation. As s/he dialogues with the pupils, s/he must draw their attention to
points that are unclear or naive, always looking at them problematically. Why? How? Is it so? What relation is there between the statement you have just made, and that of your companion? Is there any contradiction between them? Why? It can be said once more that such an approach needs time. That often there is "no time to lose," "there is a syllabus to be completed." Once again in the name of time which is not to be wasted, time is wasted. Young people are alienated by the kind of copybook thought that is almost entirely verbally narrated. Moreover, the content of what is narrated must be passively received and then memorized for repetition later. Dialogue does not depend on the content which is to be seen problematically. Everything can be presented problematically.

The role of the educator is not to "fill" the educatee with "knowledge," technical or otherwise. It is rather to attempt to move towards a new way of thinking in both educator and educatee, through the dialogical relationships between both. The flow is in both directions. The best student in physics or mathematics, at school or university, is not one who memorizes formulae but one who is aware of the reason for them. For students, the more simply and docilely they receive the contents with which their teachers "fill" them in the name of knowledge, the less they are able to think and the more they become merely repetitive. The best philosophy student is not one who discourses, "ipsis verbis," on the philosophy of Plato, Marx, or Kant but one who thinks critically about their ideas and takes the risk of thinking too. No philosophers, no scientists, develop their thought or systematize their scientific knowledge without being challenged and confronted by problems. While this does not mean that a person who is challenged automatically or necessarily becomes a philosopher or a scientist, it does mean that challenge is basic to the constitution of knowledge. Thus, when a scientist in search of one thing discovers something else, something not anticipated (this happens continually) the discovery originates in the attempt to solve a problem.
It is this that I defend: if scientific knowledge and the formulation of disciplined thought cannot be separated from a problematic approach, then the apprehension of this scientific knowledge and of this disciplined philosophical thought cannot be separated from a problematic approach to the very learning which the educatee must absorb. I sometimes have the impression (without being dogmatic) that many of those who express doubts about this rationalize their lack of belief in people and in dialogue through defense mechanisms. Their aim, basically, is to continue to be "banking" dissertators and invaders. This fear of dialogue needs, however, to be justified. The best way to do this is to rationalize it, by talking about its non-viability and about "time-wasting." This means that between the "distributors" of erudite knowledge and their pupils, there can never be dialogue. For those who think in this way, anti-dialogue is essential in the name of "cultural continuity." This continuity exists. Precisely because it is continuity, it is a process and not a paralysis. Culture only is as long as it continues to be. It endures only because it changes. Perhaps it would be better to say: culture only "lasts" when it is part of the contradictory interplay of permanence and change.

Those who fear dialogue prefer lengthy and erudite discourses full of quotations. Instead of problem-posing dialogue, they prefer a so-called "reading-control" (which is a form of controlling the students rather than the reading). This does not result in any kind of creative intellectual discipline, only in the subjugation of the educatee to the text, the reading of which has to be "controlled." Sometimes this is called evaluation. Alternatively it is asserted that young people should be "made to study," or "forced to know." Such educators have no wish to run the risk of adventuring into dialogue, the risk incurred by problem-posing. They retreat into their discursive and rhetorical classes, which have a lulling effect on students. Enjoying the narcissistic pleasure of the sound of their own words, they lull the critical capacity of the educatee to sleep.

Dialogue and problem-posing never lull anyone to sleep.
Dialogue awakens an awareness. Within dialogue and problem posing educator-educatee and educatee-educator go forward together to develop a critical attitude. The result of this is the perception of the interplay of knowledge and all its adjuncts. This knowledge reflects the world; reflects human beings in and with the world explaining the world. Even more important it reflects having to justify their transformation of the world. Problem-posing supersedes the old "magister dixit" behind which those who regard themselves as the "proprietors," "administrators" or "bearers" of knowledge attempt to hide themselves. To reject problem-posing dialogue at any level is to maintain an unjustifiable pessimism towards human beings and to life. It is to lapse back into the practice of depositing false knowledge which anaesthetizes the critical spirit, contributes to the "domesticating" of human beings, and makes cultural invasion possible.
b) AGRARIAN REFORM, CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION, AND THE ROLE OF THE AGRONOMIST-EDUCATOR

I said in the first part of this chapter that the work of the agronomist-educator cannot be limited to the substitution of new methods for the empirical practices of the peasants. There are two fundamental reasons which lead me to make this statement. One is that it is impossible to change technical practices without repercussions in other areas of human existence. The other is that neutral education cannot exist-in whatever field. In the second part of this chapter I analyze the role of the agronomist in the process of agrarian reform, without dichotomizing technology and culture.

To put it concretely, agronomists cannot reduce their actions to a non-existent neutrality as if technicians were isolated from the wider universe in which they exist as human beings. From the moment in which they enter and participate in the system of relationships between human beings and nature, their work takes on a broader perspective in which the technical training of the peasants becomes one with other dimensions which lie beyond the domain of technology. It is this unavoidable responsibility of the agronomists which establishes them as educators and makes them (among others) agents of change. This means that their participation in the system of relationships between the peasants, nature, and culture cannot be reduced to a being before, or a being over, or a being for the peasants, but a being with them in that they also are subjects of change.

This responsibility is not exclusively that of the agronomist-educator, nor even of educators in general, but of all those who in one way or another contribute to the impact of agrarian reform. Like the process of structural change, this process cannot be interpreted as a mechanical one, outside of time, which does not require the participation of human beings. Agrarian reform is not a purely technical matter. It involves political decisions that give effect and
impulse to the technological proposals which, in that they are not neutral, affirm the ideological positions of the technologists. New technology (to deal with this aspect only) can thus either support or negate the active participation of the peasants as truly co-responsible elements in the process of change. Technology can, however, offer mechanistic solutions which, when applied within a human frame of reference (and agrarian reform is clearly within this domain) will be at most apparent successes if not objective failures. "It is not technical methods but the association of man and his tools which transforms a society."\textsuperscript{21}

In the process of agrarian reform, there should be no exclusive support for either "technology" or for "humanity." Any program of agrarian reform which regards these two terms as antagonistic is naive, whether it is the attitude superficially termed "humanist:" (at heart reactionary, traditionalist and anti-transformation) which denies techniques, or whether it is the myth of techniques which in turn implies a dehumanization, a kind of messianism of techniques, conferring on technology the role of an infallible saviour: This messianism nearly always ends up by instigating the kind of programs in which humans are diminished in stature. Technical messianism (which is bourgeois in character) proposes modernization of existing structures in opposition to traditionalism, which seeks to maintain the status quo. According to this messianic conception, the passing from the old structures to the new "modernized" structures is as mechanical as the transportation of a chair from one place to another.

Since this mechanical attitude attempts to identify its modernizing action with development, it is important that I distinguish between the two. Modernization of a purely mechanical, automatic, and manipulating type has the center of decision for change not in the area undergoing transformation but outside it. The society in transformation is

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\textsuperscript{21} Octavio Paz: \textit{Claude Levi-Strauss and the New Feast of Aesop}, Editorial Joaquin, Mortiz, Mexico, 1\textsuperscript{st} edition 1957, p. 97.
not the subject of its own transformation. On the contrary, the point of decision in the process of development lies within the being undergoing transformation-the process is not a mechanical one. Hence, while all development is modernization, not all modernization is development.

Agrarian reform should be a process of development which will result in the modernization of the rural areas along with the modernization of agriculture. If this is how agrarian reform is seen, the modernization resulting from that reform will not be the product of an automatic passage from the old to the new. (Strictly speaking this would not be a "passage," but rather the superposition of the new on the old.) In the non-mechanical concept the new is born from the old through the creative transformation emerging from advanced technology combined with the empirical methods of the peasants. This means that it is impossible to ignore the cultural background which explains the technical-empirical methods of the peasants. It is on this cultural foundation-from which their forms of behavior and their perception of reality are comprised-that all those who have some responsibility for the process of agrarian reform must base their work.

It should be obvious that while the transformation of the structure of latifundia, together with the reform of land-tenure (followed by the application of new technology) is unquestionably a factor of change in the peasant perception, this does not mean that one can dispense with action on the cultural plane. As a general process agrarian reform cannot be limited to unilateral actions in the sphere of production-commercialization, techniques, etc. It should rather unite such efforts to other equally necessary forms of action: deliberate, systematized, planned, cultural transformation. Hence, in agrarian reform in Chile the "settlement,\footnote{\textit{Asentamiento}: in Chile the Dime given to a landholding expropriated by the government.} precisely because it is a production-unit (I repeat that production does not exist, without the man/woman-world relationship), should
also be a pedagogical unit, in the broad sense of the term. This pedagogical unit is one in which the educators are not only those who happen to work with what is usually termed education but are also agronomists, administrators, planners, researchers, peasants—in fact all those who have some connection with the process.

It is imperative that we protect ourselves from a mechanistic notion of reform. Such a naive, narrow outlook tends to scorn the basic contribution of other sectors of knowledge. It tends towards rigidity and bureaucracy. To speak to a technocrat of the need for sociologists, social psychologists, or educators in the process of agrarian reform produces a hint of mistrust. Therefore to speak of the need for study in the field of philosophical anthropology and linguistics constitutes a scandal to be suppressed. In fact all these are of fundamental importance for the success which agrarian reform expects to achieve. For example, what would technocrats say if we spoke of the value of a linguistic investigation of the semantic universe of the areas undergoing reform (and of the areas outside the effects of reform)? They could not understand that such an investigation could make it possible for us to discover a series of aspects which are fundamental to their own action in the domain of technical methods. From the extension of peasant vocabulary to the analysis of the "pragmatic" content of the terms, to the study of its "associative field of meaning," one arrives at possible significant "themes," referred to in the "associative field of meaning" of those terms. However, technocrats would never understand the unquestionable contribution of present studies in "structural anthropology," in linguistics or of semantics to agrarian reform. For a technocrat all this is wasting time. It is the dreams of idealists and of those without a sense of the practical.

The technocrats would also think in this way if, following the same line of thought, they were approached about study and research on the different levels of the peasant consciousness. Such consciousness is conditioned by the structure in which this consciousness is developed through historical and
existential experience, and therefore could provide critical information for the developing of reform programs. However technocrats would be unable to understand the "remaining behind" in the transformed structure of the "mythical aspects forming part of the old structure. It is sufficient for them as orthodox technocrats for the structure to be transformed in such a way that everything that made up the former structure is eliminated. When, failing to recognize the people as cultural beings, they do not achieve the results they were expecting from their unilaterally technical action, they seek an explanation for their failure—and always find it "in the natural incapacity of the peasants."

Their error is to fail to recognize that the time in which generations live, experience, work, and die is not calendar time. It is a "real" time, or "duration," as Bergson calls it. Thus it is a time made up of events in which the peasants build up through the generations their way of being (or state of being) which carries over into the new structure. This is why when the time in agrarian reform—a new time—is generated from the old time, the old co-exists with the new. The peasants in the "new time" thus manifest in their behavior the same duality which they had under the structure of latifundia. This is completely normal. "Human beings are not just what they are, but also what they were," they are in a state of being, this being a characteristic of human existence. Human existence, therefore, contrary to animal or vegetable life, is a process taking place in one's own time.

There exists, then, a solid link between the present and the past, within which the present points towards the future, all within the framework of historical continuity. Thus it is that there are no rigid boundaries in time, whose "epochal" Units interpenetrate one another. In order to understand this I shall make use of two concepts developed

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23. This sentence is in quotation because of its resemblance to the following:
"Mind is in all manifestations not only what it is, but what it was,"
Zevde Barbu: Problems of Historical Psychology.
by Eduardo Nicol\textsuperscript{24} when he discusses the question of historical truth which cannot be apprehended without historical continuity. These concepts are: "vertical structure" and "horizontal structure." "Vertical structure" forms the framework of the transformation of relationships between human beings and the world. It is with the products of this transformation that human beings create their world—the world of culture which is prolonged into the world of history.

The sphere of culture and history, the human sphere of "vertical structure," is characterized by intersubjectivity and intercommunication. But if intercommunication existed only within a single "epochal" unit, there would be no historical continuity. This can be explained in that intersubjectivity and intercommunication pass through one "epochal" unit, and continue through to the next. This intercommunicating solidarity between different "epochal" units constitutes the field of "horizontal structure."

If this is valid from the viewpoint of understanding science and "logos" (which is the point of arrival of an "epochal" unit in horizontal relation to the "logos" or the science of another unit), it is also valid for the understanding of the forms of being and knowing in the domain of "doxa" from one "epochal" unit to another. It is therefore impossible to overlook solidarity between the "vertical structure" (in Nicol's sense) of the period of \textit{latifundia} and the new structure of the "settlements." This solidarity emerges in the "horizontal structure." This being so, it is imperative that all those who work with the process of agrarian reform take into account the basic characteristics of peasant life in the reality of the \textit{latifundia}. Only the naïveté of a technocrat could permit the belief that once agrarian reform is planned and put into practice everything that existed previously ceases to exist; that reform constitutes the rigid dividing line between the old and the new.

Agrarian reform seen critically is, in fact, an all-encom-

\textsuperscript{24} Eduardo Nicol: \textit{The Principle of Science}, Fondo de Cultura Economica, Mexico, 1965.
passing action which is carried out within a totality—the reality which is to be transformed. This does not mean that the new emerging reality remains uninfluenced by the former reality. Hence, in reply to the challenges raised by the actual process of agrarian reform, the critical vision of the process reveals great possibilities for the use of specialized staff for specific jobs, without lapsing into "specialties." The technical training of specialists for work mainly in the area of technology goes hand-in-hand with serious reflections studies, and analyses of the wider dimensions of which technology is only one part. A critical attitude towards agrarian reform, with an emphasis on cultural change which recognizes the need for a perceptual change,\textsuperscript{25} opens up a new and fertile field of work for the agronomist-educator. Inspired by a critical vision of agrarian reform, the agronomists should concentrate on something more than mere technical aid. As agents of change, together with the peasants (who themselves are agents) it is incumbent on them to enter into the process of transformation, conscientizing both peasants and themselves at the same time. The conscientization I shall discuss in the final part of this work is an inter-conscientization.

While the naive technocratic conception of agrarian reform does not take into account the fact that features which characterized the old structure remain in the new one (thinking that problems are solved by technical "training"	extsuperscript{26}) the critical Vision of the process, without forgetting questions of technical instruction, places these within a broader framework. This professional instruction is not, for the critical mind, the naive act of transferring or "depositing" technology. It is the act by which the technical process is offered to the educatee as a problem which must be solved. The critical conception of agrarian reform (in which there

\textsuperscript{25} Paulo Freir: \textit{The Role, of the Social Worker in the process of Transformation. op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{26} The critical conception of the process does not use the term "training" with reference to people. "Tree. are cultivated, animals are trained, people are educated"—say Kant.
is ready awareness of the significance of "vertical structure" as the cultural and historical world in which perception is formed) puts its maximum effort in the direction of the transformation of perception. Because this conception is a critical one, it is aware that the transformation of perception is not brought about at a purely intellectual level, but with the aid of a genuine praxis which requires a constant action on reality, and a reflection on this action. This implies a sound manner of thinking and acting. Hence, as I have suggested, large-scale, intensive cultural spade-work is absolutely indispensable for this conception.

Cultural transformation, which will continue to advance inexorably with the transformation of the reality of the latifundium and which will lead to a new "vertical structure," requires action in the field of "popular culture." This will produce direct intervention in the sphere of perception and will help to accelerate cultural transformation. In the process of agrarian reform, this then is the basic task of the agronomist: rather than being a removed and distant technocrat, s/he is an educator who is involved, who goes into the process of transformation with the peasants, as a Subject with other Subjects.
Chapter III

a) EXTENSION OR COMMUNICATION?

From the first pages of this essay I have insisted that humans, as beings of relationships, are challenged by nature, which they transform through their work. The result of this transformation, which separates itself off from them, is their world. This is the world of culture which is prolonged into the world of history. This exclusive world of human beings with which geographical space is filled Eduardo Nicol describes (as I pointed out in the previous chapter) as a world of "vertical structure," related to a "horizontal structure." The "vertical structure," the social, human world would not exist if it were not a world able to communicate. Without communication human knowledge could not be propagated.

Intersubjectivity, or intercommunication, is the primordial characteristic of this cultural and historical world. The gnosiological function cannot be reduced to a simple relation between a Subject that knows and a knowable object. Without a relation of communication between Subjects that know, with reference to a knowable object, the act of knowing would disappear. The gnosiological relationship does not therefore find its term in the object known. Communication between Subjects about the object is established by means of intersubjectivity. This is why Eduardo Nicol1 after studying the three relationships comprising knowledge-the gnosiological, the logical, and the historical-adds a fourth one, which is fundamental and indispensable to the act of knowing-the relationship of dialogue. Just as there is no such thing as an isolated human being there is also no such thing as isolated thinking. Any act of thinking requires a Subject who thinks, an object thought about which mediates the thinking Subjects, and the communication between the lat-

1. Eduardo Nicol: op. cit.
ter, manifested by linguistic signs. Thus the world of human beings is a world of communication. As a conscious being (whose consciousness is one of intentionality towards the world and towards reality), the human being acts, thinks, and speaks on and about this reality, which is the mediation between him or her and other human beings who also act, think, and speak.

Discussing the function of thought, Nicol\(^2\) affirms that it should not be designated by a noun, but by a transitive verb. Strictly speaking, one could perhaps say that the verb designating thought should not be merely transitive, but should take (syntactically) the object of the action and an accompanying complement. In addition to the thinking Subject and the object thought about, the presence of another thinking Subject would be necessary (just as necessary as that of the first Subject and object), which would figure in the accompanying expression. This would take the form of a "co-subjective-objective" verb, whose action on the object would be one of "co-participation."

The thinking Subject cannot think alone. In the act of thinking about the object s/he cannot think without the co-participation of another Subject. There is no longer an "I think" but "we think." It is the "we think" which establishes the "I think" and not the contrary. This co-participation of the Subjects in the act of thinking is communication. Thus the object is not the end of the act of thinking, but the mediator of communication. Hence it cannot be communicated from one Subject to another as the object of communication, i.e., a communiqué. If the object of thought were a mere communiqué, it would not be a significant meaning, mediating the Subjects. However, once the object provides, through communication, the mediation between two Subjects "A" and "B," the subject "A" cannot have the object as an exclusive term of thought. Neither can "A" transform the Subject "B" into a depository for his thinking. When this does occur there is no communication. It

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2. Eduardo Nicol: *op. cit.*
means only that one Subject is transforming another into a recipient of his communiques.  

Communication implies a reciprocity which cannot be broken. Hence it is not possible to comprehend thought without its double function, as something which learns and as something which communicates. But this function is not the extension of the significant content of the object (i.e., the object of knowing and thinking). To communicate is to communicate about the significant content of the object. Thus during communication there are no passive Subjects. Subjects showing co-intentionality towards the object of their thought communicate its content to each other. Communication is characterized by the fact that it is dialogue, in that dialogue communicates.

In the relationship between communication and dialogue the Subjects engaged in dialogue express themselves through a system of linguistic signs. For the act of communication to be successful, there must be accord between the reciprocally communicating Subjects. That is, the verbal expression of one of the Subjects must be perceptible within a frame of reference that is meaningful to the other Subject. If this agreement on the linguistic signs used to express the object signified does not exist, there can be no comprehension between the Subjects, and communication will be impossible. The truth of this can be seen in that there is no separation between comprehension (intelligibility) and communication, as if the two comprised different moments of the same process or the same act. On the contrary, intelligibility and communication occur simultaneously. Whether or not we pay serious attention to our relations with the peasants (however they may concern us) will depend on whether we are aware of this particular observation. In dealing with a fact such as a harvest, for example, we could use a system of symbols which would not be intelligible to peasants. They

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3. In this sense the communiqués are the "meanings" which in losing their own dynamism turn into static, crystallized contents. These contents are deposited by one Subject in others thereby preventing the process of thinking. This is typical behavior of the "educator" in what I ironically term the "banking" concept of education.
could fail to understand our technical jargon with its own universe of linguistic signs. (Which suggests that normal classroom techniques are less and less recommendable for efficiency.) Problem-posing dialogue, in addition to the various reasons already mentioned which make it indispensable, diminishes the difference between the sense of an expression as given by a technician, and the grasping of this expression by the peasants in terms of its meaning for them. Thus the sense of the expression comes to signify the same for both. This occurs only in the communication and intercommunication of thinking Subjects. It never occurs in the extension of what is thought from one Subject to another.

It is not superfluous to emphasize the need for serious semantic studies which should be indispensable to the work of the agronomist. What is intelligible is only communicated insofar as it is communicable. This is why, when the significant content of the object under discussion is not comprehensible to one of the Subjects, communication cannot take place. In such cases both interlocutor-Subjects have to seek such comprehension through dialogue. For although one of them has achieved this understanding it cannot be grasped by the other as it is being expressed by the first. It is thus obvious that a search for knowledge which is reduced to the simple relationship knowing Subject-knowledgeable object (thus destroying the dialogical structure of knowledge) is a mistaken one, however much it may be a tradition.

Equally mistaken is the conception which sees the task of education as an act of transmission or as the systematic extension of knowledge. On the contrary, instead of being the transference of knowledge—which more or less "kills" knowledge—education is the gnosiological condition in its broadest sense. The educator's task is not that of one who sets himself or herself as a knowing Subject before a know' able object, and, having come to know it, proceeds to discourse on it to the educaees, whose role it is to file away the "communiqués." Education is communication and dialogue. It is not the transference of knowledge, but the encounter

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4. Discussed more fully in the second part of this chapter.
of Subjects in dialogue in search of the significance of the object of knowing and thinking.

To illustrate this analysis of communication it is helpful to examine how Urban classifies acts of communication. According to him, these acts occur basically on two levels. On one level the object of communication belongs to the sphere of emotion. On another level knowledge is communicated. In the first case (which is of no concern in this essay) communication manifested on an emotive level "operates by contagion." In this type of communication one of the Subjects evokes a certain emotional state in another (fear, joy, hate, etc.), and can be influenced by this state. Alternatively s/he can get to know this state in the Subject manifesting it. However, in this kind of communication, which is also found at an animal level, there is no "entering into" the object by the communicating Subjects.

The "entering into" the object of communication, expressed by linguistic signs, is the second type of communication distinguished by Urban. Here communication operates between Subjects about something which mediates them and which is "offered" to them as a knowable fact. This something which mediates the interlocutor-Subjects can be a concrete fact (sowing and the techniques of sowing, for example), or a mathematical theorem. In both these cases true communication is not, in my opinion, the exclusive transfer or transmission of knowledge from one Subject to another, but rather his co-participation in the act of comprehending the object. It is communication carried out in a critical way. On an emotive level communication can take place both be-

7. The strongly emotional character of the communication prevents the Subject expressing it from standing back from himself and from his situation so that he can see himself, "see it" and "contemplate it." The same operation is also made difficult for his interlocutor, who in one way or another finds himself caught up in the emotional situation. Thus it is difficult for either of them to have in the state expressed the object about which they intercommunicate at the level of knowledge.
tween Subject "A" and Subject "B," and between a crowd and a charismatic leader. Its main characteristic is to be a-critical. In the prior case communication implies the comprehension by intercommunicating Subjects of the content with reference to which the relationship of communication is established. As I emphasized in the first pages of this chapter, communication on this level is essentially linguistic.

This fact raises important problems which cannot be forgotten or lightly dealt with. They can be reduced to the following: Efficient communication requires the Subjects in dialogue to direct their "entering into" towards the same object. It requires that they express it by means of linguistic signs belonging to a linguistic universe common to both so that they can have a similar comprehension of the object of communication. In this communication, which operates through words, the relation thought-language-context or reality cannot be broken. There is no thought which does not have some reference to reality and which is not directly or indirectly influenced by reality. Hence the language expressing this thought cannot fail to show this influence too. The error to which the concept of extension can lead is clear. It is one of "extending" technical knowledge to the peasants, instead of making (by efficient communication) the concrete fact to which this knowledge refers (expressed by linguistic signs) the object of the mutual comprehension of peasants and agronomist alike. It is only with the co-participation of the peasants that communication can work efficiently, and only by means of this communication can agronomists successfully carry out their work.

Let us now look at another problem of equal importance in the field of communication, which agronomist-educators must take into consideration in their work. As I have already said, there can be no communication, if the comprehension of the meaning (signification) of the sign is not established among the Subjects-in-dialogue. If the sign does

8. Misunderstandings are common between Brazilians newly arrived in Chile and native Chileans. The similarity of linguistic signs from an ortho-
not have the same meaning (signification) for the Subjects in communication, communication ceases to be viable for lack of an indispensable comprehension. On this aspect Adam Schaff\(^9\) differentiates two types of communication: one concerned with *significata*, the other whose content is made up of *convictions*. In communication when the content is comprised of convictions, there is not only the question of the meaningful comprehension of the signs, but also the question of adhesion or non-adhesion to the conviction expressed by one of the communicating Subjects. For meaningful comprehension of the signs, the communicating Subjects must be able to reconstitute within themselves the dynamic process from which the conviction they express by means of the linguistic signs is developed.

I am able to understand the signification of the linguistic signs of a peasant from the Northeast of Brazil who tells me, with absolute conviction, that he cures 'the infected wounds of his animals by praying over the tracks they leave in the mud. As was stated above, to understand the signification of the linguistic signs used by the peasant implies that we comprehend the context in which the conviction expressed by those signs was engendered. However, neither the comprehension of the signs nor the comprehension of the context are sufficient to make me share his conviction. Thus, in not sharing the conviction or the magic belief of this peasant, I invalidate all that it contains in the way of "theory" or pseudo-science, which includes a whole area of "technical knowledge." What cannot be ignored is that contrary to the magic belief of the peasant, the domain of accepted meanings (in the sense examined here and by Schaff), seems to the peasant to be a contradiction of his "science." The

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magic conviction of the peasant, a conviction related to his incipient empirical methods, naturally comes into conflict with the technical "significata" of the agronomists. Thus it is that the relation between agronomist and peasants, planned and systematic as it is, must still unfold within a dialogical, communicating, gnosiological setting.

Even if I agreed—and this is not the case—with the "extension" form of the act of knowing, in which one subject takes the knowledge to another (who thus ceases to be a Subject), it would not only be necessary that the signs should have the same meaning, but also that the content of the knowledge "extended" should have something in common with both poles of the relationship. As this is not the case, extension has the tendency to use the methods of propaganda and persuasion in the vast area which goes by the name of "mass-media communication." These methods constitute a means of issuing communiqués to the masses. Through such methods the masses are directed and manipulated, and because of this do not become involved in the process of education for liberation. My comments are directed at those who make use of such means by error, and not for other reasons. One of the reasons for the error is that, when agronomists encounter the first difficulties in their attempt to communicate with the peasants, they do not realize that they are caused by the fact (among others) that the process of communication between human beings cannot ignore totally socio-cultural conditioning. Instead of taking their own conditioning as well as that of the peasants into account they simplify the question and conclude (as was stated in a previous chapter) that the peasants are incapable of dialogue. From this point to acts of cultural invasion and manipulation is only a step, which has practically been taken.

There is another thing which should be considered very important in the process of communication for the work of educators in their relationships with the peasants. We refer here to certain manifestations occurring in the process of communication, which are either natural or socio-cultural.
Both function within the social relationships of communication as signs which indicate or announce something. The cause-and-effect relationship which the peasants are able to perceive between these signs-natural or not-and certain facts, is not always the same as that which the agronomists perceive. In either case, whether the indicators are natural or socio-cultural, the communication between agronomists and peasants can be interrupted if the agronomists inadvertently take up positions which could be considered negative within the set limits of anyone of these indicators.

Some final considerations are indispensables to this chapter, namely on the humanist aspect which should inspire the work of communication between technicians and peasants in the process of agrarian reform. This humanist aspect is not abstract. It is concrete and rigorously scientific. This humanism is not based on visions of an ideal human being, separated from the world, the portrait of an imaginary person, however well-intentioned the person imagining might be. This humanism does not try to concretize a timeless model, a sort of idea or myth, for in this way humans become alienated. This humanism does not claim to be a what will be for lack of a critical vision of concrete human beings who tragically are in a state of being which is almost not being. This humanism on the contrary, it based on science, and not on "doxa." Not on "I should like it to be so," nor on purely humanitarian gestures. It is a humanism concerned with the humanization of men and women, rejecting all forms of manipulation as the contradiction of liberation. This humanism which sees men and women in the world and in time, "mixed in" with reality, is only true humanism when it engages in action to transform the structures in which they are reified. This humanism refuses both despair and naive optimism, and is thus hopefully critical. Its critical hope rests on an equally critical belief, the belief that human beings can make and remake things, that they can transform the world. A belief then that human beings, by making and remaking things and transforming the world, can transcend the situation in which their state of being is
almost a state of non-being, and go on to a state of being, in search of becoming more fully human. This scientific humanism (which cannot fail to be loving) must be aided by the action through communication of the agronomist-educator.

Once more I am obliged to deny the term extension the connotations of a truly educational practice as it exists in the concept of communication. I would therefore answer the question asked not only in the title of this chapter but in the whole essay—"extension or communication?"—negatively with regard to extension and positively with regard to communication.
b) EDUCATION AS A GNOSIOLOGICAL STATE

The human being is a conscious body. His or her consciousness, with its "intentionality" towards the world, is always consciousness of something. It is in a permanent state of moving towards reality. Hence the condition of the human being is to be in constant relationship to the world. In this relationship subjectivity, which takes its form in objectivity, combines with the latter to form a dialectical unity from which emerges knowledge closely linked with action. This is why unilaterally subjective and objective explanations which sever this dialectic are unable to comprehend reality. If an erroneous solipsism claims that only the Ego exists and that its consciousness embraces everything (since it is an absurdity think of a reality external to it), the a-critical, mechanistic, grossly materialistic objectivism, according to which reality transforms itself, without any action on the part of men and women (who are mere objects of transformation) is equally in error.

These two erroneous ways of considering human beings and of explaining their presence in the world and their role in history also engender false conceptions of education. One starts by denying all concrete, objective reality and declares that the consciousness is the exclusive creator of its own concrete reality. The other denies the presence of human beings as transforming beings in the world, and subordinates them to the transformation of reality which takes place without their involvement. Idealism errs in affirming that ideas which are separate from reality govern the historical process. So does the mechanistic objectivism which transforms human beings into abstractions and denies them

1. In his Third Thesis on Feuerbach, Marx lays: "The materialist theory that men are the product of circumstances and of education, and that, therefore modified men are the product of different circumstances and a different education, forgets that the circumstances are actually transformed by men and that the educator himself needs to be educated." Marx-Engels, Selected Works, Moscow, 1966. Thesis on Feuerbach III, pp. 404-405.
their presence as beings of decision in historical transformations.

Education based on one or the other of these forms of negating human beings leads to nothing. Human beings must be seen in their interaction with reality which they feel and perceive, and on which they exercise the process of transformation. It is in its dialectical relations with reality that I shall discuss education as a constant process for the liberation of human beings. Education cannot view men and women isolated from the world (creating it in their consciousness) nor the world without men and women (incapable of transforming it). Education would become a-historical in the first case for lack of the world, in the second case, because men and women would be excluded. History cannot exist without both of these. One does not find only a mechanistic process in which human beings are merely incidental to facts. Nor does one find the result of the ideas of a few human beings which have been developed in their consciousness. History, as a period of human events, is made by human beings at the same time as they "make" themselves in history. If the work of education, like any other human undertaking, cannot operate other than "within" the world of human beings (which is a historical-cultural world), the relations between human beings and the world must constitute the starting-point for our reflections on that undertaking. These relations do not constitute a mere enunciation, a simple sentence. They involve a dialectical situation in which one of the poles is the person and the other the objective world—a world in creation, as it were. If this historical-cultural world were a created, finished world, it would no longer be susceptible to transformation. The human being exists as such, and the world is a historical-cultural one, because the two come together as unfinished products in a permanent relationship, in which human beings transform the world and undergo the effects of their transformation. In this dynamic, historical-cultural process, one generation encounters the objective reality marked out by
another generation and receives through it the imprints of reality.

Any attempt to manipulate people to adapt them to this reality (quite apart from being scientifically absurd, since adaptation implies the existence of a finished, static reality --not one which is being created) means taking from them their opportunity and their right to transform the world. Education cannot take this road. To be authentic it must be liberating. One of its basic preoccupations must be the greater penetration of the "prise de conscience" which operates in human beings when they act and when they work. This deepening of the prise de conscience which takes place through conscientization, is not and never can be an intellectual or an individualistic effort. Conscientization cannot be arrived at by a psychological, idealist subjectivist road, nor through objectivism, for all the reasons I have mentioned. Just as the prise de conscience cannot operate in isolated individuals, but through the relations of transformation they establish between themselves and the world; so also conscientization can only operate in this way. The prise de conscience, which is a human characteristic, results as we have seen, in a person's coming face to face with the world and with concrete reality, which is presented as a process of objectification. Any objectification implies a perception which is conditioned by the elements of its own reality. The prise de conscience exists on different levels. There is a magic level as well as a level in which the objectified fact fails to be apprehended in all its complexity.

If the prise de conscience goes beyond the mere apprehension of the presence of a fact, and places it critically in the system of relationships within the totality in which it exists, it transcends itself, deepens, and becomes conscientization. This effort of the prise de conscience to transcend itself and achieve conscientization, which always requires one's critical insertion in the reality which one begins to unveil, cannot, I must repeat, be individual but social. It is sufficient to know that conscientization does not take place in abstract beings in the air but in real men and women and in social struc-
tires, to understand that it cannot remain on the level of
the individual. It would not be superfluous to repeat that
conscientization, which can only be manifested in the concrete
praxis (which can never be limited to the mere activity
of the consciousness) is never neutral; in the same way,
education can never be neutral. Those who talk of neutrality
are precisely those who are afraid of losing their right
to use neutrality to their own advantage. In the conscientization
process the educator has the right, as a person, to
have options. What s/he does not have is the right to impose
them. To do this is to prescribe these options for
others. To prescribe is to manipulate. To manipulate is "to
reify" and to reify is to establish a relationship of "domestication"
which may be disguised behind an apparently inoffensive
façade. In this case, it is impossible to speak of conscientization.
The false educator can only "domesticate"
because instead of undertaking the critical task of demythifying
reality, s/he mythifies it further. It is indispensable
for such educators to issue communiqüés instead of communicating
and receiving communications. At no moment
can they establish a truly gnosiological relationship since
this would make manipulation impossible.

This then is why I say that "education as the practice of
freedom" is not the transfer, or transmission of knowledge I
or cultures. Nor is it the extension of technical knowledge.
It is not the act of depositing reports or facts in the educatee.
It is not the "perpetuation of the values of a given
culture." It is not "an attempt to adapt the educatee to the
milieu."

I see "education as the practice of freedom" above all as
a truly gnosiological situation. In this the act of knowing
does not have its term in the knowable object since it is
communicated to other Subjects which are also capable of
knowing. In the educational process for liberation, educator-educatee
and educatee-educator are both cognitive Subjects
before knowable objects which mediate them. One can say
then, and I have heard it on numerous occasions: "How can
educator and educatee possibly be put on a par in the search for knowledge if it is the former who already knows? How can the educatee be said to be capable of knowing if his or her role is to learn from the educator?" These observations, which are basically objections, cannot conceal the preconceptions of the person who makes them. They always originate with those who consider themselves to be the possessors of wisdom face to face with the educatees who are regarded as ignorant. Education through dialogue and communication is seen by them in their misinterpretation (whether erroneous or ideological) as a threat. It is in fact a threat to their false knowledge.

Many of those who reject communication, and avoid the true state of knowing which is a state of participation with, do so because in the face of knowable objects, they are incapable of taking up a cognitive position. They remain in the realm of "doxa" beyond which they are the mere repeaters of texts read but not known. In truly gnosiological education there is not one particular moment in which, all alone in a library or laboratory, the educator "knows," and another moment in which s/he simply narrates, discourses on, or explains the knowledge "received." At the moment in which educators carry out their research, when as cognitive Subjects they stand face to face with a knowable object, they are only apparently alone. Not only do they establish a mysterious, invisible dialogue with those who carried out the same act of knowing before them, but they engage in a dialogue with themselves too. Place face to face before themselves they investigate and question themselves. The more they ask questions the more they feel that their curiosity about the object of their knowledge is not decreasing. It only diminishes if it is isolated from human beings and the world.

This is why dialogue as a fundamental part of the structure of knowledge needs to be opened to other Subjects in the knowing process. Thus the class is not a class in the traditional sense, but a meeting-place where knowledge is sought and not where it is transmitted. Just because the edu-
cator's task is not dichotomized into two separate moments (one in which s/he "knows," and another in which s/he speaks about this "knowledge"), education is a permanent act of cognition. Educators never allow themselves to be bureaucratized by high-sounding, repetitious, mechanical explanations. So much so that whenever an educatee asks a question, educators in their explanations remake the whole previous effort of cognition. Remaking the effort does not, however, mean repeating it as it was. It means making a new effort, in a new situation, in which new aspects which were not clear before are clearly presented to the educatee. New ways of access to the object are opened to him or her.

The teachers who do not make this effort, because they merely memorize their lessons, must of necessity reject education as a gnosiological condition and can thus have no love for the dialogue of communication. Education for them is the transfer of "knowledge." It consists in extending this "knowledge" to passive educatees and preventing them from experiencing the development of the active, participatory condition, characteristic of someone who knows. This false conception of education, based on the depositing of "reports" in the educatees, is a basic obstacle to transformation. It is an anti-historical conception of education. Educational systems based on this conception surround themselves with a "barricade" which inhibits creativity.

For creativity does not develop within an empty formalism, but within the praxis of human beings with each other in the world and with the world. In this praxis action and reflection constantly and mutually illuminate each other. Its practice, which involves a theory from which it is inseparable, also implies the attitude of someone seeking knowledge, and not someone passively receiving it. Thus, when education is not a truly gnosiological condition, it diminishes into a verbalism which, because it frustrates, is not inconsequential.

The relations between verbalist educators, who discourse on memorized "knowledge" (which has not been researched or carefully examined) and their educatees is a type of edu-
cational technical aid. In this type of technical aid empty words are like the "presents" characteristic of forms of aid in the social field. Both forms of technical aid-material or intellectual-prevent those "aided" from having a clear and critical view of reality. Such aid prevents them from "unveiling," from revealing and apprehending reality as it is. It prevents those "aided" from seeing themselves as being "aided." When education abandons the true gnosiological condition to take the form of verbal narrative, it deprives the educatees of the chance of transcending the domain of "doxa" and reaching that of "logos." If they succeed in this, it is in spite of their education.

The "technical aid" conception of education "anaesthetizes" the educatees and leaves them a-critical and naive in the face of the world. But the conception of education which recognizes (and lives in this recognition) that it is a gnosiological condition, challenges them to think rather than to memorize. The former is rigid, dogmatic, and authoritarian. The latter is mobile and critical. It does not confound authority with authoritarianism, nor liberty with libertinism. It recognizes within time the relations between one epochal unit and another which builds across the "horizontal structure" and explains cultural "duration." "Duration" does not mean permanence but the interplay between permanence and transformation. In the first conception education is an instrument of domination. In the second it is the constant search for liberation.

If education is the relation between Subjects in the knowing process mediated by the knowable object, in which the

2. However, the fact that aid, whatever its form, contains this obstructive feature, does not mean that those receiving aid cannot emerge sooner or later from their condition of being aided in order to establish themselves as beings of decision by action. I venture to state that the movements of rebellion which are prevalent today have a lot to do with the emergence of the young (and in certain areas the people) who break with a "technically aided" and "technically aiding" world. They place in question the validity of the "communiqués" issued in the name of "technical aid" on the subject of human existence. Their preoccupations concern not only the instrumental field of how, but extend to the what, why, and wherefore of things in the field of action and existence.

educator permanently reconstructs the act of knowing, it must then be problem-posing. The task of the educator is to present to the educatees as a problem the content which mediates them, and not to discourse on it, give it, extend it, or hand it over, as if it were a matter of something already done, constituted, completed, and finished. In the act of problematizing the educatees, the educator is problematized too. Problematization is so much a dialectic process that it would be impossible for anyone to begin it without becoming involved in it. No one can present something to someone else as a problem and at the same time remain a mere spectator of the process. S/he will be problematized even if methodologically speaking, s/he prefers to remain silent after posing the problem, while the educatees capture, analyze, and comprehend it.

In the process of problematization, any step made by a Subject to penetrate the problem-situation continually opens up new roads for other Subjects to comprehend the object being analyzed. Educators who are problematized by engaging in this kind of action "re-enter into" the object of the problem through the "entering into" of the educatees. This is why educators continue to learn. The humbler they are in this process the more they will learn. Problematization takes place in the field of communication and concerns real, concrete, existential situations. Or it concerns intellectual contents again linked to the concrete. It requires that the interlocutor-Subjects, who have been problematized, understand the total meaning of the signs (linguistic and otherwise) used in communication. The understanding of the signs comes from the dialogue, which makes possible the exact understanding of the terms with which the Subjects express the critical analysis of the problem in which they are involved. I should once again emphasize that problematization is not an intellectual diversion, both alienated and alienating. Nor is it an escape from action, a way of disguising the fact that what is real has been denied. Problematization is not only inseparable from the act of knowing but also inseparable from concrete situations.

Taking these last as the point of departure, an analysis of
concrete situations brings the Subjects once more to see themselves in their confrontation with such situations and to undergo again this confrontation. Thus problematization implies a critical return to action. It starts from action and returns to it. The process of problematization is basically someone's reflection on a content which results from an act, or reflection on the act itself in order to act better together with others within the framework of reality. There can be no problematization without reality. Discussion about \textit{transcendence} must take its point of departure from discussion on the \textit{here}, which for humans is always a now too.

The conception of education which I am defending, and which I present in summary as a problem-content to readers of this essay, centers around the problematization of the human being and the world, not the problematization of the human being isolated from the world, nor the world isolated from the human being. The relations created between them cannot be dichotomized. However, as this observation is important, it needs clarification. What \textit{is} the problematization of the human being and the world? What \textit{is} the problematization of the relations between them which cannot be dichotomized? This is not the problematization of the term "relation" \textit{per se}. The term "relation" suggests the position of a human being face to face with the world, suggests that s/he is in it and with it as a being who works, acts, and transforms the world. It would be legitimate to discuss the concept of "relation" at the strictly human level, contrasting it, for example, with contact, at the animal level. It would be equally possible to discuss it from a linguistic, philosophical, sociological, anthropological, etc., point of view.

Of fundamental importance to education as an authentically gnosiological condition is the problematization of the world of work, products, ideas, convictions, aspirations, myths, art, science, the world in short of culture and history which is the result of the relations between human beings and the world. To present this human world as a problem for human beings is to propose that they "enter
into" it critically, taking the operation as a whole, their action, and that of others on it. It means "re-entering into" the world through the "entering into" of the previous understandings which may have been arrived at naively because reality was not examined as a whole. In "entering into" their own world, people become aware of their manner of acquiring knowledge and realize the need of knowing even more. In this lies the whole force of education in the gnosiological condition.

Men and women as Subjects in the knowing process (and not receivers of a "knowledge" which others donate to them or prescribe for them) progress towards the raison d'être of reality. Reality shows them progressively a world a challenge and possibilities; of determinism and liberty; of negation and affirmation of their humanity; of permanence and transformation; of value and valuelessness; of expectation, in the hopefulness of search; and of expectation without hope in a fatalist inaction. The more they review critically their past and present experiences in and with the world, which they can see more clearly now because they are reliving it, the more they realize that the world is not a cul-de-sac for men and women, an unalterable state which crushes them. They discover--or become predisposed to discover--that education is not solely and exclusively permanence or change in something. Education is "duration," because it results from the interplay of these two opposites in dialogue. Education shows "duration" in the contradiction of permanence and change. This is why it is possible to say that education is permanent only in the sense of duration. In this case "permanent" does not mean the permanence of values, but the permanence of the educational process, which is the interplay between cultural permanence and change.

The above-mentioned dialectic-permanence/change--which makes the educational process "durable," interprets education as something which is in a state of being, and not something which is. Hence, its historical-sociological aspect. If education did not adapt to the rhythm of reality it would
not "last," because it would not be in a state of being. Thus education can also be a force for transformation, because it "lasts" to the degree that it transforms itself. But its transformation must be the result of the transformations effected in the reality to which it applies. This is to say that the education of a society stops being in a state of being if it is determined by the transformations effected in another society on which it depends. If the education of a society does not exist in a concrete context, showing the influence of human beings and at the same time influencing them, it cannot advance the transformation of the reality of that society. Imported education, which is the manifestation of a form of being of an alienated culture, is something which is merely superimposed on the reality of the importing society. Hence this education which is not because it is not being in a dialectic relationship with its context, contains no force of transformation for reality. As we can see, education as a gnosiological condition which unites educator and educatee as Subjects in the process of knowing, opens for them innumerable and indispensable roads leading to their affirmation as beings of praxis.

It is thus that we see the work of agronomist-educators. In it they must seek to know reality through dialogue with the peasants, in order to more effectively transform it together with the peasants. I said that education as a gnosiological condition means the problematization of the content on which educator and educatee as Subjects in the process of knowing concentrate. The Subjects in the process of knowing, in their co-intentionality towards the object, penetrate it in search of its raison d'être. And the object, in revealing itself to the Subjects, appears to them within a structural system in which it is in direct or indirect relation with another object. The object (which can be a problem-situation) initially "entered into" as if it were an isolated whole. "gives itself up" to the Subjects in the process of knowing as a "sub-whole" which in turn forms part of a greater totality. Step by step the Subjects in the process of knowing advance towards the union of the parts which make up the
whole. Thus, for example, sowing is taken critically as part of a larger reality-cum-process. It is in direct relation not only to other aspects of this reality-cum-process but also to natural and cultural phenomena. Thus sowing is associated with soil conditions, with meteorological conditions, with the set time for carrying it out, with the kind of seeds, and also with the techniques used, with the magic beliefs of the peasants, as well as with land-tenure. In a sense, any effort implies an effort towards totalization.

It is not possible to teach methods without problematizing the whole structure in which these methods will be used. No program of literacy-training can exist as the naive claim—which is not connected with the work of human beings, their technical proficiency, their view of the world. Any education work, whether the educator is an agronomist or not, which only means discoursing, narrating, or speaking about something, instead of challenging the capacity of reflection and knowledge of the educatees about it, not only neutralizes this capacity for knowledge, but merely skirts the problems. The educator's action encourages "naïveté" rather than conscientization on the part of the educatees. Thus the authenticity of technical aid depends upon its becoming educational actions (in the sense I have defined it), transcending the procedures of purely technical "assistentialism."

In the course of this chapter I have suggested an aspect which is of the greatest importance for the education I am defending. Of the Subjects in the knowing process, who proposes the basic themes which are the object of the act of knowing? If education as a gnosiological condition has its core in the dialogue relationship, since without it the co-intentionality of the Subjects of the knowable object would disappear, when does this relationship begin? How is the curriculum of this kind of education organized? The answers to these questions are more or less implicit not only in

4. For this see Paulo Freire: "La Alfabetizacion de Adultos: la critica de su vision ingenua y la comprension de su vision critica," op. cit.
this chapter but in the main part of this essay. However, because they are only implicit, it is incumbent on me to clarify them.

If education can be defended as an eminently gnosiological condition (which is therefore dialogical) in which educator-educatee and educatee-educator are problematized and unite around a knowable object, it is obvious that the point of departure of the dialogue is the quest for a curriculum. Thus the problem-contents which will make up the curriculum on which the Subjects will carry out their gnosiological action cannot be chosen by one or the other of the dialogical poles in isolation. If it were so, and unfortunately this is how it is seen (usually that the choice of direction falls exclusively on the educator), the task of education would take a vertical, donating, "aiding" form\(^5\) from the beginning.

If the task of drawing-up the technical-aid program falls exclusively on the agronomist-and the team s/he works with-without taking into account the peasant's critical perception of their reality, even if s/he is up-to-date with the most urgent problems in the rural area in which s/he is going to work, s/he will tend toward the cultural invasion I spoke of in the last chapter. I have already mentioned this in other parts of this essay, but I will repeat it, that frequently what constitutes a real problem for us is nothing of the sort for the peasant, and vice versa. It is equally frequent for the peasants, in spite of the magical background of their culture, to show considerable empirical knowledge about basic problems of agricultural techniques. In any case, If the dialectics of education and its gnosiological aspect are taken into consideration, it is impossible to dispense with a preliminary knowledge of the aspirations, the levels of perception, the view of the world which the educatees (in this case the peasants) have. With this knowledge as a starting-

\[^5\] This anti-dialogical way of organizing the problems (which are prolonged in the anti-dialogue of the educational activities engaged in) fail. not just because it contain an ideology of domination-and this is not always perceived by the person who uses it-but also by the total absence of scientific discipline I hope to clarify this in the following pages.
point, the educational curriculum can be organized to include a group of themes on which educator and educatee as Subjects in the knowing process can use their ability to know.

To know the peasants' manner of seeing the world which contains their "generative themes" (which, after being taken, studied, and placed in a scientific setting, are returned to the peasants in the form of problem themes) implies a search. This in turn requires a methodology which should be, in my opinion, dialogical, problem-posing and conscientizing.6 Research into the "generative themes," and education as a gnosiological condition, are different stages of the same process. If one offers the peasants their own theme, so that in the act of knowing they can dialogue on it with the educator (whether an agronomist or not) it will "generate" other themes when at a later stage it is apprehended in its relationship with other related themes through the transformation undergone by the perception of reality.7 Thus one passes from a stage which tends mainly towards the search for the "generative theme" to another whose tendency is mainly educational-gnosiological. At the same time as the comprehension of reality is being heightened through the act of knowing, a new theme is being sought out.

Thus the content of education springs from the peasants themselves and their relations with the world, and transforms and broadens itself as the world becomes revealed to them. The "research groups" are prolonged into "cultural discussion groups." These in turn require new educational contents of different standards which demand further thematic research. This state of dialectics generates a dynamic which transcends the static character of the naive conception of education, which is the mere "transmission" of

6. See Pedagogy ....
7. For the transformation of perception and structural transformation see Paulo Freire: The Role of the Social Worker in the Process of Transformation, op. cit.
8. For this see Jose Luis Fiori: "Dialectic or Liberty: Two Dimensions of the Search for Themes," ICIRA, Santiago.
knowledge. Hence, action based on it is the complete opposite of the action which consists merely of the extension of the contents which have been selected by one of its poles.

Technical aid, which is indispensable in any sphere, is only valid when its curriculum which grows out of the search for "generative themes" of the people, goes beyond pure technical instruction. Technical proficiency capacitation is more than just instruction, because it is a search for knowledge, using the appropriate procedures. It can never be reduced to the level of training (in the way animals are trained), since technical proficiency capacitation only takes place in a human setting. Unlike animals, whose activity is themselves, human beings are capable of reflecting not only on themselves but on their activity, which is something separate from them, just as the product of their activity is separate from them. Technical aid, of which proficiency capacitation is a part, can only exist through praxis, if it is to be genuine. It exists in action and reflection and in the critical comprehension of the implications of method. Technical proficiency capacitation as distinct from the training of animals can never be dissociated from the existential conditions of the life of the peasants, from their cultural viewpoint or from their magic beliefs. It must begin at the level at which they are, and not at the level at which the agronomist reckons they should be. It is when they are challenged to think about how and why they exist in a certain way, to which their own type of techniques corresponds, and when they are challenged to reflect on why and how they can use this or that type of technique, that they are really genuinely capacitated.

There is another aspect which I must clarify. Given that we can count on various groups of peasants in a certain area, who are prepared to participate in a course of technical proficiency capacitation, and whose "thematic universe" we already know, what do we do, and how do we act? The "treatment" of the theme researched considers the "reduction" and the "codification" of the themes which make up

9. See Pedagogy....
the program as a structure, that is, as a system of relationships in which one theme leads obligatorily to others, all joined in units and sub-units within the program.

Thematic "codifications" are the representations of existential situations-situations of work in the fields where the peasants are using some less efficient method of working; situations representing scenes apparently dissociated from technical process and yet which have some relation to the, etc. The interlocutor-Subjects, faced with a pedagogical "codification"\textsuperscript{10} (problem-situation), which as I said represents a given existential situation, concentrate on it. seeking through dialogue the significant comprehension of its meaning. Since this is a gnosiological condition in which the knowable object is the existential situation represented in it, it is not the role of educators to narrate to the educatees (the peasants) what in their opinion constitutes their knowledge of reality or of the technical dimension involved in it. On the contrary, their task is to challenge the peasants once again to penetrate the significance of the thematic content with which they are confronted.

The codification represents an existential situation, a Situation "lived" by the peasants, which they either do not "enter into" in the process of living it, or if they do, their "entering into" is merely being aware of the situation. The de-coding, as an act of knowing, allows them to "enter into" their own prior perceptions of their reality. De-coding is thus a dialectical moment in time, in which the consciousness,

\textsuperscript{10} The pedagogical codification can be distinguished from the advertising slogan because:
A. The nucleus of the former consists of a broad significatum expressed by a number of information factors; the nucleus of the latter consists of a singular, concise significatum, made up of “announcing factors” pointing in a single direction imposed by the propagandist;
B. The former, which is problem-posing, implies a de-coding to be carried out dialogue between the educator-educatee and the educatee-educator. Precisely because the latter has a single “announcing” nucleus, it only needs a single de-coding. Faced with an advertising slogan, two million inhabitants of Santiago de-code it in the same way; otherwise It would be publicity gone wrong.
C. In the former there is true communication, which is intercommunication. The latter shows "communiqués." The former “critiques,” the latter “simplifies” (through naïveté, one of the levels of perception of reality).
concentrated on the challenge of the codification, rebuilds its power of reflection in the "entering into" of present understanding which progresses towards a new understanding. Through this process, the peasants progressively recognize that it is they who transform the world. If cutting down a tree, chopping it into sections, making planks of it and using them to make tables and chairs previously meant little more than just physical work, these acts with the aid of "re-entering into," now take on the true significance they should have: that of praxis. Table and chairs will never again be just table and chairs. They are something more. They are the products of a person's work. S/he would have to begin by this discovery if s/he were to learn to make them better.

The first moment in the de-coding process seems to be that in which the educatees begin to describe the elements of the codification, which make up the whole for them. But in fact there is a moment in time which precedes this. It is the moment when the consciousness directed towards the codification apprehends it as a whole. In general it is in a person's silence that this occurs. "Entering into" takes place in the moment when the consciousness establishes relations with the object of its intentionality. The descriptive stage is a second moment in the process, when the totality undergoing the "entering into" process is split. This splitting does not end the action of apprehending the codification as a whole. It is a movement in which the Subject as it were glimpses reality from within. In a third moment in time, the Subject in conjunction with others returns to the previous state of "entering into" in which to take in the coded situation as a whole. The Subject prepares itself in this way to see the situation as a structure in which the various elements are found in a closely knit relationship. As the critical perception is heightened, and as it becomes impossible to accept "focalist" explanations of reality, the fourth moment in the de-coding process takes place. In this fourth moment, the Subject achieves the critical analysis of what is repre-

sented by the codification, and as its content expresses his or her own reality, the criticism is of this.

All the steps mentioned here, which are not so rigidly separated as their description implies, form part of the conscientization process, which results in men and women being able to achieve their critical insertion in reality. Education which does not attempt to make this effort, which rather insists on the transmission of communiqués, on the extension of technical contents, cannot conceal its dehumanizing aspect. The agronomist-educators whose work requires that the peasants receive technical proficiency capacitation--I have said it already but it would be good to repeat it--cannot ignore it as a process of real knowing. They cannot use technical proficiency capacitation for its own sake, nor purely and exclusively as a means of increasing production, which without a doubt, is indispensable. As well as being a means of increasing production, which is a social phenomenon, technical proficiency capacitation should, as a process, become an object of reflection for the peasants. This reflection should help them discover the whole complex of relationships in which this capacitation is involved.

To take a more critical and a more historical viewpoint, this is precisely why not only technical proficiency capacitation but any other popular dimension of education in agrarian reform or otherwise, in Latin America and the Third World in general, must be associated with the effort being made so that simple human beings, as beings prevented from existing as people, can distinguish themselves as human beings. Chilean educators endeavoring to put into practice this conception of education in their work with the peasants have frequently quoted in their reports comments made by the peasants, such as: "There is no difference between humans and animals; when there is, the latter have the advantage--they are freer than we are .... " I have frequently mentioned the coding of themes, introducing the reader to a previous study of mine which has been quoted on various occasions. 12 This codification represents an existential situa-

12. See Pedagogy of the Oppressed, op. cit.
tion whose content leads to the central theme to be analyzed. It can be represented by a photograph, a drawing, or equally well by a poster. The object representing the codification—be it photograph, drawing or poster—is merely, however, a point of reference. A visual point of reference is just that and no more. It can just as well be used as an efficient expedient for "domestication" as for purposes of liberation.

My preoccupation throughout this essay has been to illuminate the principles and the basic aspects of an education which will be "the practice of freedom." What is important is that the agronomist-educator should know, whatever points of reference s/he may have at his or her disposal, that these are secondary, and are only justifiable if they are used in an undertaking which aims at liberation. This undertaking requires something basic from anyone of the Subjects participating in it—that they ask themselves if they really believe in the people, in ordinary people, in the peasants. If they are really capable of communing with them, of "proclaiming" the world with them. If they are incapable of believing in the peasants, of communing with them, they will at best be cold technicians. They will probably be technocrats, or even good reformers. But they will never be educators who will carry out radical transformations.